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DOCTRINES OF DELUSION: HOW THE HISTORY
OF THE G.I. BILL AND OTHER INCONVENIENT
TRUTHS UNDERMINE THE SUPREME COURT'S
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
Juan F. Perea*
INTRODUCTION
At its inception, affirmative action was understood as a necessary remedy for
past discrimination. Fifty years ago, President Lyndon B. Johnson recognized the
importance of affirmative action in the pursuit of equality:
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate
him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, "you are free to
compete with all the others," and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair .... This is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for
civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal
equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as
a fact and equality as a result.... To this end equal opportunity is essential but
not enough, not enough.
Johnson's speech was 'the first moment when a president ... forcefully and
visibly sponsored affirmative action for blacks."2 Johnson understood that racial
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to Mark Brodin, Paul
Finkelman, Jasmine Gonzalez-Rose, Paul Gowder, Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Jennifer Rosato Perea, Barry
Sullivan, Alex Tsesis, and Mike Zimmer for thoughtful and helpful discussions and comments. Thanks
to Nick Infusino and David Landau for superb research assistance.
I President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University, June 4, 1965 (reprinted
in IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 175 (2005)).
21d.
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equality required more than the equal opportunity guaranteed in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
In the years since Johnson's exhortation to action, the Supreme Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence has steered us far away from his vision of
affirmative action as necessary to achieve equality between whites and blacks.
Rather than seeing affirmative action as a remedy for past discrimination, today's
Court interprets affirmative action as a presumptively objectionable program that
denies equality to whites. The Court's trajectory has uncoupled affirmative action
from its social and historical context and from its most powerful justification.' In
my view, remedying past societal discrimination is the most compelling reason for
affirmative action.
Notwithstanding, since Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke,4 the Court has, with one exception, consistently rejected
past societal discrimination as a compelling government interest.' In Powell's
words, "remedying the effects of 'societal discrimination,' [is] an amorphous
concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past" and is therefore not
a compelling government interest.6 But what if it can be shown that past societal
discrimination is neither "amorphous" nor "ageless" in its reach into the past? What
if the foundations of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, later embraced by the full
Court, can be shown to be false and misleading when evaluated in the context of
historical and sociological evidence? If the foundations of Bakke, and later Court
decisions on affirmative action, turn out to be apocryphal, then we would have to
wrestle with the implications of Supreme Court resistance to affirmative action
based on false premises.
In this Article, I test the validity of the Court's analytical premises in the
affirmative action cases against historical and sociological evidence. Powerful
arguments for affirmative action can be made based on the relatively recent World
' Lee C. Bollinger, A Long, Slow Drift From Racial Justice, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/opinion/a-long-slow-drift-from-racial-justice.html? r-0. Bollinger
was sued in his capacity as President of the University of Michigan at the time of the Gratz and Grutter
lawsuits. Id.
4 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
'The exception is Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), in which the Court approved of a federal
set-aside program for minority businesses in the construction industry based on Congressional findings
of nationwide discrimination in that industry.
6 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307, 310.
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War I-era history of the federal government's policies and subsidies encouraging
race discrimination against blacks in education and housing.' In the design and
implementation of the G.I. Bill, the federal government explicitly encouraged
residential segregation and discrimination against blacks. The G.I. Bill deliberately
left the distribution and implementation of federal education and housing benefits
to universities, private banks, realtors, and white homeowners' associations, all of
whom discriminated openly and pervasively against blacks. This design was
necessary to accommodate the desires of southern congressmen to maintain their
system of racial segregation, just as had occurred during the New Deal.'
I rely on World War I-era history for several reasons. First, the federal
encouragement and subsidization of segregation and race discrimination against
blacks is clear, provable, and undeniable.9 There can be no clearer a violation of
equal protection principles than the outright racism of the federal government in
subsidizing preferences for whites and discrimination against blacks.
A second reason is that many white Americans continue to benefit from the
federal government's racism of that era. Contrary to the beliefs of the nearly two-
thirds of whites who "do not believe that whites have benefitted from past and
present discrimination against African-Americans,""l this history makes crystal
clear that whites as a group benefitted enormously from this race discrimination.
Although the G.I. Bill is often described in universal, celebratory tones as the
"magic carpet to the middle class," this was only true for white veterans, their
families, and their heirs. Chiefly because of the racist administration of the G.I.
7 In stating that World-War II era discrimination provides a powerful argument for remedial affirmative
action, I do not mean to disparage at all the economic and educational legacies of the continuous racism
inflicted upon American blacks by whites since the founding and settlement of the English Colonies
nearly four hundred years ago. I mean only that the more recent World War II-era history provides
recent evidence that proves extensive white racism and its injurious consequences for blacks. Sadly, and
incorrectly, it is easy for many whites to dismiss the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow as "past," and
"amorphous" in a way that undermines the legitimacy of arguments for a remedy. I think it is harder to
do so with more recent history. I will address the characterization of past discrimination as "amorphous"
infra.
8 See generally Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural
and Domestic Worker Exclusion in the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (2011)
[hereinafter Perea, Echoes of Slavery] (documenting the way that federal legislation accommodated
Southern and Northern racism during the New Deal era by excluding blacks from statutory protections).
9 See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
10 ROBERT J. BLENDON ET AL., THE PUBLIC AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON RACE, THE PUBLIC
PERSPECTIVE 66, 68 (1998).
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Bill's housing benefit, white veterans were able to purchase homes, while black
veterans were denied access to real estate purchases. The subsequent run-up in
house prices has generated an enormous amount of wealth for white homeowners
that was denied to African-Americans. As one example, by 2010 the median net
worth, including home equity, of white households had grown to $110,729.11 The
comparable figure for black households had grown to only $4,955, only 4.4% of
the net worth of whites. 12 White baby boomers and their children enjoy the benefits
of a huge economic windfall that was denied to African-American families and
their children because of the federal government's knowing subsidization of racism
in the housing market.13
A final reason is that the history of World War II-era racism gives us an
important factual basis against which we can assess the intellectual foundations of
the Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. One of the striking aspects
of this jurisprudence is the disconnection between what the Court says and
provable facts of our history. 4 I identify seven highly influential assumptions,
premises, and conclusions that Justice Powell relied on in constructing his opinion
in Bakke. Though initially articulated just by Justice Powell, these premises have
been adopted by the full Court and continue to influence the Court's analysis in
affirmative action cases.
For purposes of better flow and coherence, I have organized these premises
into three sets. The first is a set of three assumptions about affirmative action
generally: (1) an increase in the stigma borne by students of color is a proper
argument for curtailing affirmative action; 5 (2) affirmative action constitutes racial
preference for "no reason other than race or ethnic origin"' 6 and "reverse
U1 .S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TABLE 1, MEDIAN VALUE OF ASSETS FOR
HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE OF ASSET OWNED AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 2010 (2012).
121d
"3 Baby boomers are defined as the generation that was born between 1946 and 1964. Many of today's
boomers are the children of the generation of veterans that served during World War II.
14 This is the "uncoupling of affirmative action from its social context" referred to by Lee Bollinger. See
supra note 3.
"S "Preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable
to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual
worth." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
16 "Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination
for its own sake." Id. at 307.
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discrimination" against whites; and (3) whites are innocent victims who should not
bear the burdens of affirmative action.17 The second set of premises forms the basis
for applying strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases: (4) whites have also been
victims of discrimination and there is no principled way of distinguishing between
the discrimination experienced by whites and blacks;' 8 and (5) equal protection
must mean the same thing when applied to whites and to blacks.19 Lastly, the Court
has reached two important conclusions about what constitutes a compelling
government interest: (6) remedying past societal discrimination is too "amorphous"
and is not a compelling government interest; 20 and (7) diversity is a compelling
government interest.2' Upon close analysis, and using the historical context
provided by the GI Bill, these premises and conclusions turn out to be either false,
misleading, or protective only of white interests. Despite their falsity, these
premises are widely believed. Because of both their falsity and widespread public
belief in them, I call these the doctrines of delusion.
Since Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the most important reason for
affirmative action-to remedy government-sponsored race discrimination-has
played little or no role in the Court's decisions. Only by returning to the historical
context surrounding affirmative action can we reclaim the importance of
affirmative action as a remedy for past government and private discrimination. This
historical background makes clear that what is needed is more affirmative action
and different affirmative action, not the drastically curtailed version the Court
grudgingly endorses for the time being.
Part I of this Article traces the history of the federal government's overt
encouragement and subsidization of race discrimination against blacks in the period
surrounding the Bill. Part II evaluates the premises underlying the Court's
7 "There is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's position to bear the
burdens of redressing grievances not of their making." Id. at 298; see also id. at 307, 310.
IS "The white 'majority' itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a
history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.... There is no
principled basis for deciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which
would not." Id. at 287.
" "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection it
is not equal." Id. at 289-90.
20 "Remedying the effects of 'societal discrimination,' [is] an amorphous concept of injury that may be
ageless in its reach into the past" and is not a compelling government interest. Id. at 307, 310.
21 Id. at 314-15.
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affirmative action jurisprudence in the context of historical and sociological
evidence. Part III explores the congruence between the Court's premises on
affirmative action and the public's views on race. This congruence, and the
outcomes in the affirmative action cases, suggest that the Court is a majoritarian
institution intent on protecting the educational and economic interests of whites.
I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S RACISM: PUBLIC
SUBSIDIES FOR PRIVATE RACISM
A. The New Deal Era
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there were few or no constraints
prohibiting the federal government from subsidizing and promoting racism. And
subsidize racism it did. In the New Deal era, and continuing well after 1964, the
federal government discriminated against blacks in federal statutes and in eligibility
for and the distribution of federal cash benefits.
22
The politics of the New Deal era caused the federal government's support for
racism. Jim Crow was rampant in the South. Southern democrats controlled most of
the important congressional committees and held the balance of power required to
pass any federal legislation.23 Southern legislators were unwilling to support
legislation that would pay federal benefits directly to blacks and so threaten the
plantation economy of the South.2 4 Direct payments would lessen the financial
dependence of blacks and weaken exploitive sharecropping arrangements prevalent
throughout the agricultural South. 25 In order to enlist the political support of these
southern democrats, President Roosevelt and northern democrats agreed to
legislation that excluded blacks.26
22 See generally Perea, Echoes of Slavery, supra note 8. Lyndon Johnson was well aware of the federal
government's discrimination against blacks. Johnson served as a southern democrat from Texas in the
House of Representatives from 1937 through 1949, and in the Senate from 1949 through 1961, a period
encompassing the implementation of New Deal era legislation and the drafting and implementation of
the G.I. Bill. This was the context that motivated President Lyndon Johnson's call for affirmative action
beyond the equality of opportunity promised under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
23 HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS 45 (1978); Perea, Echoes of Slavery, supra note 8, at
102-03.
24 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 19; ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND
THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 24 (1998).
25 LIEBERMAN, supra note 24, at 27-28.
26 Perea, Echoes of Slavery, supra note 8, at 102-03; SITKoFF, supra note 23, at 44.
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Blacks were excluded from all of the major enactments of the New Deal era:
the Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act.27 The principal technique for exclusion was the ostensibly race-
neutral exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers from all of these statutes.
28
Most southern blacks, and about two-thirds of all black employees, were employed
as agricultural and domestic workers, so this exclusion effectively excluded most
blacks from the benefits and protections of these statutes. The major benefits of
New Deal legislation-old-age pensions, unemployment compensation, the right to
bargain collectively, and minimum-wage and maximum hours protections-were
thus denied to most black employees. 29 To this day, "agricultural and domestic"
workers remain excluded from the protections of the National Labor Relations Act,
a vestige of New Deal-era racism.30
Another important technique of exclusion was the purposeful decentralization
of the administration of federal benefit payments.3 Southern legislators understood
that centralized federal administration and direct benefit payments to blacks would
pose severe threats to the existing racial order in the South.3 2 Southern legislators
shaped New Deal legislation so that state, local, and county-level administrators, all
white, were responsible for administering federal benefit payments and resolving
disputes over these payments.33 In the South, these exclusively white administrators
were committed to preserving white racial hierarchy over blacks.3 4 Consequently,
white administrators would regularly favor the interests of white farm owners and
deny benefits to black sharecroppers and tenant farmers, keeping these black
farmers financially dependent on exploitive sharecropping arrangements.35 In this
way, local administration of federal benefits became a crucial structural
arrangement that facilitated the continuation of the quasi-plantation southern
economy and its rigid racial hierarchy, much to the benefit of whites.
27 Perea, Echoes of Slavery, supra note 8, at 104.
28 Id. at 103-04.
29 Id. at 10.
30 Id. at 96.
31 Id. at 102; LIEBERMAN, supra note 24, at 29-30, 37.
32 Perea, Echoes of Slavery, supra note 8, at 102; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 19.
33 See, e.g., Perea, Echoes of Slavery, supra note 8, at 107-09.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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These two features of New Deal-era legislation provided a potent paradigm
for preserving white racial dominance and privilege in future legislation, including
the G.I. Bill. First was to draft the legislation in race-neutral language, to avoid
alienating overtly black voters and representatives dependent on black votes.
Second was to design the legislation so that federal benefits would be administered
by state and local governments. Designing local administration into the structure of
federal benefits legislation, by deferring to the traditional racist values prevailing in
most communities, guaranteed that federal benefits would be distributed in a way
that privileged whites.
B. Structural Racism and the G.I. Bill
The G.I. Bill (or, "the Bill"), also known as the World War II Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944, was a massive federal program intended to ease the
transition of veterans back into civilian life.36 The Bill is widely celebrated as one
of the "finest two or three [laws] Congress has passed since the constitution took
effect."37 According to President Bill Clinton, the Bill was President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "most enduring legacy," giving "generations of veterans a chance to
get an education, to build strong families and good lives, and to build the nation's
strongest economy ever ... [and to help] unleash a prosperity never before
known."38 The Bill "enabled millions of working class Americans to go to college,
buy their own homes, and become, in reality, members of the middle class."39 The
Bill is widely credited with creating the American middle class.4
°
While the Bill created a more middle class society, it did so "almost
exclusively for whites."41 Accordingly, while the Bill is uniformly celebrated in the
white community, it has a very different legacy in the black community. One
contemporary observer noted that "the veterans program had completely failed
36 See Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (1945); KATHLEEN J.
FRYDL, THE GI BILL 1-2 (2011).
3 7 See FRYDL, supra note 36, at 1; MICHAEL J. BENNETT, WHEN DREAMS CAME TRUE: THE GI BILL AND
THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA, at x, 22 (1996).
38 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 114 (quoting Office of Press Secretary, White House, "Remarks by the
President at 'Remembering Franklin D. Roosevelt,' 50th Anniversary Commemorative Services," Little
White House, Warm Springs, Georgia, Apr. 12, 1995).
39 id.
4 FRYDL, supra note 36, at 1; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 114.
41 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 114.
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veterans of minority races."4 2 A major report on black veterans concluded that it
was "as though the G.I. Bill had been earmarked 'For White Veterans Only."' 43
How could such a revered law have been so discriminatory? The answer to
this question lies in the structural design of the Bill, which followed the paradigm
developed during the New Deal era. The statute was carefully race-neutral on its
face, making no distinctions between qualified veterans because of their race. The
Bill was also carefully designed however to require federal benefits to be
administered locally and so to conform to local prejudices, justas had occurred
during the New Deal. In this way, ostensibly race-neutral legislation was purposely
designed to be administered locally in a way that denied black veterans access to
their putative benefits.
To understand the racism designed into the Bill, it is important to understand
that before and during World War H, the federal government operated largely
based on Jim Crow. The entire federal military, the Veterans' Administration (VA),
and VA hospitals were segregated. The military was segregated into all-white and
all-black units." Housing, training, and recreational facilities were also
segregated.45 Segregation meant unequal and inferior treatment for black soldiers,
who were subject to abuse, violence, and race discrimination, both on base and in
surrounding communities.46 As described by historian Kathleen Frydl, "[a]ssaults
on African-American soldiers came at the hands of white soldiers, but even more
frequently, from local police and local civilians who could not bear to see the
prized citizenship status of a uniform adorn a black man."47
Since the military was so segregated, it is easier to understand how Congress
could incorporate segregationist values and race discrimination into legislation
intended to benefit ex-military members. Reflecting essentially the same political
dynamics that prevailed during the New Deal era, the Bill was enacted by a
42 Id.
43 Id. at 115.
" See FRYDL, supra note 36, at 223-26; CYD MCKENNA, THE HOMEOWNERSHIP GAP: HOW THE POST-
WORLD WAR II GI BILL SHAPED MODERN DAY HOMEOWNERSHIP PATTERNS FOR BLACK AND WHITE
AMERICANS 15-19 (2008), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/44333/
276173994.pdf (last visited June 23, 2013); KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 101-02.
45 McKENNA, supra note 44, at 15-18.
46 FRYDL, supra note 36, at 223-26; MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 15-19.
41 FRYDL, supra note 36, at 225.
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Congress intent on preserving southern segregation. 4 "Race was contested terrain
in the very inception of the G.I. Bill. '4 9 The legislation was drafted under the
leadership of Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi, chairman of the House
Committee on World War Legislation. Rankin was one of Congress's "most
unashamed racists."5 Rankin's chief priority was to protect the segregated order of
the Jim Crow South. 1 Two important veterans' organizations, the American
Legion (the Legion) and the VA, were also principals in drafting and supporting the
legislation. Both the Legion and the VA were segregated and opposed any attempt
to challenge the segregated and unequal racial order in the South.52 The principal
legislative device for excluding blacks was to allow local administration of
federally supplied benefits under the loose supervision of the VA. Local
administration permitted the enforcement of Jim Crow segregation in the South and
de facto segregation in the North. 3 As described by historian Ira Katznelson, the
"alliance of the Rankin-led South, the VA, and the Legion produced a bill
combining generosity to veterans with provisions for the dispersion of
administrative responsibilities that were designed to shield Jim Crow."
54
Pervasive race discrimination against blacks in higher education and housing
meant that the Bill's benefits were enjoyed mostly by white veterans.
Approximately 16 million veterans, of whom slightly over 1 million were black,
ostensibly qualified for benefits under the Bill."5 While white veterans prospered as
they pursued higher education and purchased homes with their Bill benefits, black
veterans languished as they were frequently denied access to their benefits because
of their race.
The following sections describe in detail the race discrimination experienced
by black veterans as they attempted to use their federal benefits and the
41 Id. at 141-42, 145; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 121-29.
' Hilary Herbold, Never a Level Playing Field: Blacks and the GI Bill, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 104
(Winter 1994/1995).
50 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 123.
s Id. at 125-26.
52 Id.; FRYDL, supra note 36, at 121, 140-42.
53 Id. at 121, 229; McKENNA, supra note 44, at 15-19, 30; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 123.
54 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 124.
51 McKENNA, supra note 44, at 5-7, 43; FRYDL, supra note 36, at 1, 186, 265; KATZNELSON, supra note
1, at 116; BENNETT, supra note 37, at 116.
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consequences of that race discrimination.56 The Bill provided numerous economic
benefits, ostensibly to all veterans who had served at least 90 days and who had
received an honorable discharge.57 In this Article I will focus on two of the most
important benefits, the education benefit and the housing benefit. 58
1. The Education Benefit
The education benefit provided for up to $500 per year to pay for tuition at
educational or technical training institutions and a monthly living allowance while
a veteran was in school. 59 These cash benefits were paid directly to individuals
rather than to institutions, which allowed veterans to use this benefit for tuition at
any educational institution that accepted them.6" Accordingly, this benefit
substantially eased any financial constraints that might have been barriers to entry
for poor veterans. This benefit was also available to veterans who sought
vocational or technical training.6
Though the legislation was race-neutral in its language, pervasive race
discrimination against blacks in higher education meant that blacks were largely
denied equal access to their federal education benefits. With few exceptions, most
colleges and universities in the country admitted only token numbers of black
students. "Southern colleges, virtually without exception, barred black students
from attending, and the situation was only marginally better in elite northern
colleges."62 Harvard, for example, admitted only a handful of black students, at
56 I focus on the experiences of black veterans because the discrimination against them was more
pervasive and severe than the discrimination faced by veterans of other minority groups. Japanese-
American and Latino veterans, in some cases, also suffered severe discrimination in attempting to use
their federal benefits.
11 FRYDL, supra note 36, at 1-2; see also Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346,
58 Stat. 284 (1945). The federal government was quite generous with World War I veterans. From
1944-1971, the federal government spent about $95 billion on G.I. Bill benefits. The bill was the "first
billion-dollar home credit insurance program and the first billion-dollar student loan program." About
$14.5 billion was spent on the education benefit. Between 1944-1952, the VA guaranteed 2.5 million
home mortgages and paid for over one-third of all new home construction, nearly 5 million homes.
"' See Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (1945); FRYDL, supra
note 36, at 1-2.
9 See FRYDL, supra note 36, at 1-2.
6 Sarah Turner & John Bound, Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the GI. Bill and
World War l on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans, 63 J. ECON. HIST. 145, 148 (2003).
61 Id. at 149.
62
MEYER WEINBERG, A CHANCE TO LEARN 266 (1977).
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most.63 Even the University of Pennsylvania, the most inclusive Ivy League
institution at the time, admitted only 46 black students out of 9,000 students, about
one-half of one percent.6'
Princeton "long had a systematic policy of excluding blacks. '65 During the
1940s, Princeton debated the question of whether or not to admit blacks and
decided against it.66 A survey of student opinion taken in 1942 found that 62
percent of Princeton students opposed the admission of black students.67 One-third
of those who supported the admission of blacks favored limitations on them,
including "dormitory segregation, exclusion from the eating clubs, the imposition
of higher standards than those used for whites, and definite quotas."
68
One incident is instructive regarding the race discrimination at Princeton. In
1939, Bruce Wright, a black student, was admitted to Princeton by accident and
was awarded a full scholarship. When he arrived to register, Wright was hurriedly
pulled out of line by an upperclassman and taken to see the Dean of Admissions.
Wright recounted that the Dean looked at him "as though [he] was a disgusting
specimen under a microscope." 69 The Dean then told him that he was not wanted at
Princeton and that he should go some place for "his own kind."7 Wright reported
being "shattered" by the incident and eventually enrolled at Lincoln University.71
Because of their exclusion from white schools in the North and the still-
segregated South, 95 percent of black veterans aspiring to higher education had to
seek it at about 100 "Colleges for Negroes" in the South.72 These colleges,
however, were severely underfunded and had inadequate facilities incapable of
63 JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN 52, 236 (2005).
64 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 130, 134.
65 KARABEL, supra note 63, at 232.
66 Id. at 232-36.
67 Id. at 235.
68 Id. at 235.
69 Id. at 232-33.
70 Id.
7' KARABEL, supra note 63, at 232-33. Wright later won a Bronze star and a Purple Heart for his service
during World War II, and later had a distinguished career as a lawyer and a judge. Id.
72 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 130; Turner & Bound, supra note 60, at 151 (2003).
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meeting the demand. 73 Accordingly, in 1947 alone, 20,000 black veterans were
turned away from black colleges.74 One survey showed that 55% of black veterans
who applied to southern black colleges were turned away due to lack of space. 75
Despite the ostensible availability of educational benefits to all veterans,
black veterans did not enjoy the same quality or quantity of educational
experiences as their white counterparts. Some black veterans were able to take
advantage of their benefits by attending college or vocational training schools. 76
The Bill improved the educations and professional prospects of many black
veterans. In the end, however, black veterans did not benefit to nearly the degree
that white veterans did.
Through the Bill's purposeful design requiring decentralized administration of
the education benefit, the federal government subsidized white colleges and
universities that adhered to racist admissions policies that denied admission to
black students. The federal government also subsidized the growth and expansion
of these institutions. As found in the 1948 report of President Truman's Committee
on Civil Rights, "[i]t is clear there is much discrimination, based on prejudice, in
admission of students to private colleges, vocational schools, and graduate
schools.... In many of our northern educational institutions ... there is never
more than a token enrollment of Negroes."77 Even worse, southern white
institutions were completely segregated and closed to blacks.
This history of race discrimination practiced by almost all white colleges and
universities provides ample justification for affirmative action in higher education
today. The federal government's design to accommodate this race discrimination,
together with its subsidies for this race discrimination, only strengthens the case.
Because of race discrimination against blacks, the Bill actually widened the gap in
73 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 131-33. Some evidence shows that black veterans wanted further
education more than white veterans. One government study showed that, after G.I. Bill benefits were
publicly announced, 43 percent of black enlisted men "expressed a definite interest in education and
training," compared to 29 percent of white enlisted men. Turner & Bound, supra note 60, at 151.
74 David H. Onkst, First a Negro ... Incidentally a Veteran: Black World War Two Veterans and the
G.L Bill of Rights in the Deep South, 1944-1948, 31 SOC. HIST. 517, 529-30 (1998).
75 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 132; Turner & Bound, supra note 60, at 152-53.
76 Turner & Bound, supra note 60, at 171; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 134; Onkst, supra note 74, at
532.
77 COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 23 (1948).
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educational attainment between blacks and whites.78 It also exacerbated existing
and future income inequalities, since white incomes increased substantially more
with the attainment of college educations.7 9 Affirmative action programs in higher
education begin to provide a remedy for the educational and economic costs caused
by widespread white racism in higher education.
2. The Housing Benefit
Federal mortgage guarantees led to the virtually exclusive enrichment of
white veterans and the near-total exclusion of black veterans. The housing benefit
provided federal government guarantees of up to 50% of loans made by private
banks and lending institutions to veterans for the purchase or construction of
homes, farms, and business properties.8" Yet because the vast majority of financial
institutions simply refused to make loans to African-Americans, black veterans
were denied access to this benefit.81 In the words of the leading scholar of the G.I.
Bill, "it is more accurate simply to say that blacks could not use this [housing
benefit]."82
The federal government, through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
and the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), had a direct hand in this housing
discrimination. The extensive role played by the FHA in encouraging race
discrimination in mortgage lending is described by Charles Abrams:
From its inception FHA set itself up as the protector of the all-white
neighborhood. It sent its agents into the field to keep Negroes and other
minorities from buying homes in white neighborhoods. It exerted pressure
against builders who dared to build for minorities, and against lenders willing to
lend on mortgages. This official agency not only kept Negroes in their place but
pointed at Chinese, Mexicans, American Indians, and other minorities as well. It
not only insisted on social and racial "homogeneity" in all its projects as the
78 Turner & Bound, supra note 60, at 145, 172.
79 Id.; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 134.
o FRYDL, supra note 36, at 1-2.
81 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 139; THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS 46-47
(2005).
82 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 139; FRYDL, supra note 36, at 237-38.
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price of insurance but became the vanguard of white supremacy and racial
purity-in the North as well as the South.
83
The FHA's Underwriting Manual provides evidence of the federal
government's race discrimination. Until 1948, the underwriting manual "explicitly
identified Black Americans as unreliable and undesirable buyers." 4 The FHA
manual recommended racially restrictive covenants until 1950.85 This was fully two
years after the Supreme Court decided that such covenants were unenforceable and
contrary to public policy in Shelley v. Kraemer.6 The FHA manual even included a
model racially restrictive covenant, which read as follows:
No persons of any race other than ---------- [race to be inserted] shall use or
occupy any building or any lot, except that this covenant shall not prevent
occupancy by domestic servants of a different race domiciled with an owner or
tenant.
87
Black, Latino, and Japanese-American veterans were barred from desirable
suburban housing due to the operation of these covenants, even if they could find a
bank willing to lend to them.88
The FHA actively promoted segregated neighborhoods. Prior to the Bill, the
HOLC, had established a grading system for neighborhoods which ultimately
institutionalized "redlining" to maintain segregated neighborhoods.89 The HOLC
grading system was used to rate neighborhoods as desirable or undesirable for the
83 CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 229-30 (1955) [hereinafter ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS]; SUGRIUE, supra note 81, at 43-44.
84 DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 191 (1995); see also KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER 198-201 (1985) [hereinafter JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER] ("black neighborhoods were
invariably rated as Fourth Grade.... As was the case in every city, any Afro-American presence was a
source of substantial concern to HOLC.").
85 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 54 (1993); ABRAMS,
FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, supra note 83, at 230.
86 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
87 ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, supra note 83, at 230; KING, supra note 84, at 191.
88 FRYDL, supra note 36, at 238.
89 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 51; JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER, supra note 84, at 197-
201.
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purposes of bank lending: Grade A was for properties in areas that were
"homogeneous and in demand as residential locations"; Grade B was for areas that
were "completely developed"; Grade C was for areas that exhibited "infiltration of
a lower grade population ... as well as neighborhoods lacking homogeneity"; and
Grade D was for areas "characterized by detrimental influences . .. such as
undesirable population'or an infiltration of it." 90 The presence of blacks in a
neighborhood would virtually guarantee a grade of "D." 91 "As was the case in
every city, any Afro-American presence was a source of substantial concern to
HOLC. 9
2
The HOLC's concerns about the presence of blacks in a neighborhood was
influential and was adopted and promulgated by the FHA.93 According to the FHA
underwriting manual (the "underwriting manual"), "if a neighborhood is to retain
stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same
social and racial classes."94 Following the principles established by the HOLC,
blacks were the presumptively undesirable population of greatest concern. A
federal appraiser assigned D grades to Kansas City, because "a large negro
population is scattered over all parts of the city which is one of the reasons for the
preponderance of D or fourth class grade security areas."95 In Detroit, every
neighborhood "with even a tiny African American population was rated 'D,' or
'hazardous' by federal appraisers and colored red on the HOLC Security Maps." 96
Federal underwriting guidelines thus directed and enabled race discrimination
by private banks and real-estate brokers. According to historian Thomas Sugrue,
Private-sector discrimination was neither the reflection of the invisible hand of
the free market, nor the consequence of blacks acting in accordance with a
90 KING, supra note 84, at 191; SUGRUE, supra note 81, at 43-44.
91 See JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER, supra note 84, at 198-201 ("[B]lack neighborhoods were
invariably rated as Fourth Grade.... As was the case in every city, any Afro-American presence was a
source of substantial concern to HOLC.").
92 1d. at 201.
93 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 52; JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER, supra note 84, at 208;
SUGRUE, supra note 81, at 43-44.
94 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 54.
9' KING, supra note 84, at 191.
9 SUGRUE, supra note 81, at 44.
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preference to live in segregated neighborhoods. Rather, it was a direct
consequence of a partnership between the federal government and local bankers
and real estate brokers. In fact the boundaries between the public and private
sectors in housing were blurry in the postwar period.... Federal housing policy
gave official sanction to discriminatory real estate sales and bank lending
practices.
97
Banks, already leery of lending to blacks, were given further incentives by federal
guidelines to lend only to whites buying properties in segregated white areas.
98
This was a major factor that gave rise to all-white suburbs surrounding cities. 99
Private realtors worked together with banks to promote housing segregation
and race discrimination against potential black home buyers. According to the
Code of Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), the
code governing private realtors, "A realtor should never be instrumental in
introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy, members of
any race or nationality, or any individual whose presence will clearly be
detrimental to property values in the neighborhood."' 0 0 A 1943 pamphlet published
by NAREB gave examples of potential buyers who would lower property values:
The prospective buyer might be a bootlegger who would cause considerable
annoyance to his neighbors, a madame who had a number of Call Girls on her
string, a gangster who wants a screen for his activities by living in a better
neighborhood, or a colored man of means who was giving his children a
college education and thought they were entitled to live among whites.1 01
97 1d. at43.
98 Id. at 34.
99 FRYDL, supra note 36, at 300-01; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 114, 116.
1t0 ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, supra note 83, at 156; MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 50 (emphasis
added); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 37.
101 ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, supra note 83, at 156; see also MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 50
(emphasis added); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 37.
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Realtors thus treated well-qualified black buyers as persons "whose presence will
clearly be detrimental to property values." Realtors who violated these guidelines
by attempting to sell to black buyers were subject to threats and violence. 102
Residents of all-white neighborhoods also participated actively, and violently,
to keep their neighborhoods segregated and white. White homeowners created
homeowners' associations to police and enforce the racial boundaries of their
neighborhoods in the name of protecting property values.1"3 In the few cases in
which a black person successfully purchased or rented a home in a formerly all-
white neighborhood, whites from the neighborhood and nearby would gather into
mobs, numbering thousands, and would threaten black residents, break windows,
fire gunshots, throw firebombs into black-owned homes, and literally burn the
homes to the ground. 1 4 Police sympathetic to the white mobs did little to protect
black residents. 10
5
Because of these discriminatory policies and practices, black veterans were
essentially unable to purchase homes. This was true both in the North and in the
South. In the New York metropolitan area, in 1950, for example, only about 69 of
69,666 VA loans, less than one-tenth of one percent, were held by non-whites. 0 6 In
Mississippi, in 1947, only 2 out of 3,229 VA loans went to black veterans.107 The
lack of government-backed loans for black veterans prompted President Truman to
create an Advisory Committee on Housing Policy. This committee concluded, with
some understatement, that "too often, the opportunities of minority group families
102 JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL
SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 37 (2013); SUGRUE, supra note 81, at 216.
103 SUGRUE, supra note 81, at 211-18; ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS, supra note 83, at 181-87.
104 BELL, supra note 102, at 33-44, 35; ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETrO: RACE AND
HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940-1960, at 53-67, 95 (1998) (describing massive, violent white riots in the
Chicago neighborhoods of Cicero, Fernwood, Englewood, Park Manor, Airport Homes, and Trumbull
Park). Although the degree of mob violence against black residents has diminished in recent decades,
move-in violence is still commonly faced by blacks who move into white neighborhoods. Some white
neighbors threaten and vandalize black-owned homes and their owners, often forcing the African-
American homeowners to sell their properties out of fear of more serious harm. See BELL, supra note
102, at 57-81.
105 HIRSCH, supra note 104, at 94-99.
6 MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 59.
107 Id.; Onkst, supra note 74, at 522. Even by the mid-1970s, less than 2% of FHAiVA mortgages had
gone to African-Americans. MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 74.
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to obtain adequate housing are extremely limited or non-existent."' 8 As two
scholars of the issue concluded, "the vast majority of FHA and VA mortgages went
to white middle-class suburbs."' 9 The enormity of this racist tragedy is
accentuated by the fact that, according to a survey of World War II veterans, nearly
the same percentages of black and white veterans were interested in home
ownership."
0
3. The Economic Consequences of the G.I. Bill
The racially discriminatory policies built into the structure of the G.I. Bill
had, and continue to have, profound economic consequences."' These
discriminatory policies yielded wealth and economic privilege for white veterans
and relative impoverishment for black veterans."12 The Bill widened the education
and income gap between whites and blacks to the benefit of whites."I3 The Bill also
widened enormously the wealth gap between whites and blacks, again to the
benefit of whites.' 14
A substantial part of the enormous wealth gap between whites and blacks is
explained by the Bill's facilitation of home ownership for whites and its effective
denial of home ownership for blacks." 5 By 1984, the date when most G.I. Bill
mortgages had matured, 7 out of 10 whites owned homes, but only 4 out of 10
blacks owned homes." 6 That ratio of home ownership remains virtually identical
today. "17
18 KING, supra note 84, at 191-92; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 54-55; Onkst, supra note 74,
at 522; MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 58.
109 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 54.
110 MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 37-41.
'1 See, e.g., FRYDL, supra note 36, at 300-01.
112 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH 150 (1995).
11' Turner & Bound, supra note 60, at 172; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 134.
114 FRYDL, supra note 36, at 238; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 121.
"' OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 150.
116 MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 81; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 164.
17 The most recent available data for the 3rd Quarter, 2012, shows that 73.6% of whites owned homes
and just 44.1% of blacks owned homes. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TABLE 7,
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY RACE AND ETHNICrrY OF HOUSEHOLDER (2012), available at
www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/qtr312/q3l2press.pdf; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 164.
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The greater rate of white homeownership, together with higher valuations for
white-owned homes and the run-up in housing prices over the last several decades
has yielded much white wealth. In 1984, the average value of white-owned homes
was $52,000; the corresponding figure for black-owned homes was less than
$30,000.'18 By 2006, the median value of white-owned homes was $185,500; the
corresponding figure for black-owned homes was $129,700.119 Higher property
values of white-owned homes, plus the higher percentage of white homeownership,
means good things for white neighborhoods, such as a higher tax base. This tax
base finances good schools, services, and infrastructure.12 ° Conversely, lower
property values and homeownership rates for black families means a much lower
tax base, with correspondingly lower funding for schools, services, and
infrastructure.121 In the words of the leading scholar of the G.I. Bill, "it is clear that
local decisions that vitiate the tax base and resources of cities were linked to
discriminatory federal housing policy. ' 12
The higher value of white-owned homes, together with the higher rate of
white homeownership, means that whites have obtained much wealth attributable
to discriminatory federal housing policies. Home equity constitutes the most
substantial portion of wealth, about 60 percent of that of America's middle class. 123
Home equity also finances other forms of wealth creation, such as borrowing
against equity at favorable rates, investments, home improvements, and college
education. 124
Home equity and wealth also produce inheritances. Many white baby
boomers (bom between 1946-64) and their children have benefitted directly from
the government's discriminatory policies through inheritances. The mean lifetime
inheritance at age 55 for white baby boomers is $125,000; for black boomers the
corresponding figure is only $16,000.125
118 MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 81.
119 Id.
120 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 62-65; FRYDL, supra note 36, at 300-02; MCKENNA, supra
note 44, at 76-77.
121 MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 81-82; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 164.
122 FRYDL, supra note 36, at 300-01.
123 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 64; MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 76, 84.
124 MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 76-77.
125 Id. at 78; OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 155-56.
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These large disparities in inheritances extend the economic, educational, and
social privileges of whites. Parental wealth is a significant indicator of the socio-
economic status of adult children and is vital in perpetuating the class status of
adult children. 12 6 Relatively wealthy white parents are able to provide their adult
children with tuition assistance, assistance with down payments on homes, and,
eventually, with inheritances. 127 Of course, because of their much lesser wealth and
inheritances, most African-American parents are not able to provide these
economic and social privileges to their children.
28
The most remarkable statistics summarizing the vast disparities in wealth
created by the federal government's discriminatory policies are statistics on net
worth. In 1984, the median net worth of white households was $39,135; the
corresponding statistic for black households was $3,397, about 9% of the median
net worth for whites.1 29 By 2010, the median net worth, including home equity, of
white households had grown to $110,729.13° By 2010, the median net worth of
black households had grown to only $4,955, now only 4.4% of the net worth of
whites, a decrease of over 50% in percentage terms since 1984. 11 Net worth is
important because net worth finances dreams: educational dreams, such as college
and graduate school preparation and tuition; and economic dreams, such as a down
payment for a home or other asset acquisition.1
32
Much white wealth and white privilege in education, and, conversely, black
poverty and lack of privilege in education, are inextricably tied to the federal
government's discriminatory policies promoting racism and segregation.'33 Racial
preferences for whites-promoted by the federal government and implemented by
educational institutions, banks and realtors to a great degree have created the vast
disparities in wealth and education enjoyed by whites and suffered by blacks today.
126 MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 83.
127 Id. at 78-79; OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 152-56; FRYDL, supra note 36, at 298.
128 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 152-53; Herbold, supra note 49, at 104, 106.
129 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TABLE 1, MEDIAN VALUE OF ASSETS FOR
HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE OF ASSET OWNED AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 2010 (2012).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Cf OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 2.
133 SUGRUE, supra note 81, at 43.
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This government-encouraged and government-subsidized race discrimination
and its enormous educational and economic consequences constitute the strongest
argument for affirmative action. The government's racism caused a large,
measurable amount of economic and educational damage to African-American
veterans of World War II, their families, and the generations of their heirs since
that discrimination. As stated originally by President Lyndon Johnson, affirmative
action for blacks and other persons of color is a necessary remedy for the
government's own race discrimination.
C. Towards a New Affirmative Action
The principle lying at the very heart of the Equal Protection Clause is that
racially discriminatory state action must be remedied. The scope of the
government-sponsored race discrimination described above suggests the contours
of a new affirmative action. Corresponding to this proven discrimination, a new
affirmative action should have at least two facets: (1) remedying the race
discrimination in higher education financed by the government and (2) remedying
the economic harms caused by the government's encouragement and subsidization
of racial segregation and race discrimination in housing.
In higher education, that should mean adhering to and expanding race-
conscious admissions. Most colleges and universities in existence during the 1930s
and 1940s explicitly discriminated against blacks. Princeton excluded all blacks.
Harvard and Yale each had tiny quotas for black students. All the white institutions
of higher learning practiced outright race discrimination, denying educational
opportunities to African-Americans for many years. Affirmative action in higher
education today, while insufficient in scope to right the harms of past
discrimination, at least constitutes a small remedy for the race discrimination in
which almost all white colleges and universities engaged. If anything, its scope
should be greatly enlarged to better correspond to the scope of past race
discrimination in higher education. Affirmative action in higher education is
nothing more than a small step towards justice.
Affirmative action should also redress the economic harms caused by
government-directed and government-financed segregation and racial
discrimination in housing. A program of economic and educational development
benefits could be targeted at identifiable victims of the government's
discrimination and their descendants. To compensate for the denial of access to G.I.
Bill benefits, a program might include educational grants, subsidized mortgages,
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and business and construction loans.1 34 Such a program could be understood as a
G.I. Bill for blacks, finally making benefits available to them that were once made
available exclusively to whites.' 35 Congress could enact such a program using its
enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 The courts
have upheld, under strict scrutiny, Congress's similarly motivated payment of
reparations to Japanese-American victims of internment during World War 11.137
The compelling moral and practical goal of such a program ought to be "bettering
the social conditions in which African Americans live," "[conditions that] affect
everyone in our society."
' 138
This Part has presented evidence of the history of government-sponsored race
discrimination in the structure and implementation of the Bill and the consequences
of that discrimination. There is much evidence proving such discrimination. It is
not difficult to conceive of the parameters of an appropriate remedy for this race
discrimination. This evidence constitutes the strongest justification for affirmative
action: as a remedy for proven past federal government discrimination.
Notwithstanding this compelling evidence of the federal government's role in
promoting segregation and race discrimination, the Supreme Court has never taken
adequate account of this evidence in its affirmative action jurisprudence. Indeed,
the Court has disparaged the remedying of past societal discrimination as not
"compelling." '139 The Court has thus reached a conclusion that, is exactly the
opposite of the conclusions reached by President Johnson and, later, Congress,
regarding the need for affirmative action as a necessary part of the pursuit of
equality. 4 ° The Court's conclusion is also counterintuitive, since remedying past
114 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 171.
135 While this is not his most preferred solution, Professor Roy Brooks has made just such a proposal for
a G.I. bill for blacks. See ROY L. BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 120-22 (2009).
136 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
137 See Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F. 2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
138 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 170 (citing Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education:
Confronting the Condition and the Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 569 (2002)).
"' See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307, 310; Croson, 488 U.S. at 499, 520; Grutler, 539 U.S. at 324.
141 Congress responded to the need for affirmative action by enacting specific set-asides and targets for
the employment of minority-owned businesses in the construction industry. These set-asides were
initially upheld as constitutional in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 463-67 (1980). After the
Court's turn to colorblindness, however, the Court has rejected such set-asides in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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discrimination and eliminating present discrimination are, or should be, the most
important purposes underlying enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. 141 The
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence has been awry from the start, avoiding
entirely the appropriate remedial role that affirmative action should have. Using the
history of government-sponsored racism in the Bill, the next Part of the Article
analyzes how and why the Supreme Court has gone so wrong.
II. DENYING THE PAST AND THE PRESENT: ANALYZING THE
PREMISES UNDERLYING THE SUPREME COURT'S
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
The Bakke case was the Supreme Court's first sustained engagement with
affirmative action. Although the case produced no majority opinion, Justice Powell
announced the judgment of the Court. Although Powell wrote only for himself, his
opinion has exerted great influence on all the major affirmative action cases
decided since Bakke: Croson,142 Adarand,143 Grutter,144 and now Fisher145 stand as
prominent examples. Indeed, in Fisher the Court reiterated the continuing influence
of the principles Justice Powell first articulated in Bakke. 1
46
One of the most striking developments in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
has been the use of Bakke and other affirmative action decisions to curtail the
consideration of race in other substantive areas. 147 In the school desegregation
context, for example, Chief Justice Roberts used the reasoning in Bakke to curtail
the use of race in school-assignment decisions. 48 And in the employment
discrimination context, Justice Kennedy used the affirmative action cases to uphold
the interests of white firefighters eligible for promotion against the interests of
141 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf., e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987).
)42 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
14' 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
1 539 U.S. 306, 322-25 (2003).
'45 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
146Id. at 2417-19.
147 See generally Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination,
Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010); Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci's "Color-Blind"
Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended Consequences, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257
(2009).
' See Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,720, 722-25 (2007).
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black firefighters disqualified from promotion because of disparate results on a
promotion test.14
9
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke has, therefore, been remarkably influential
in the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence and other substantive areas. Powell
has been identified rightly as the principle architect of the current Court's ideology
of colorblindness.15 Accordingly, it is important to identify and analyze the
fundamental assumptions and premises supporting his opinion, for these premises
provide the intellectual foundation for the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence.
This Part explores the highly influential assumptions and premises that Justice
Powell relied on in constructing his opinion in Bakke. I have organized these
premises into three sets. The first is a set of three assumptions about affirmative
action generally: (1) an increase in the stigma borne by students of color is a proper
argument for curtailing affirmative action;15' (2) affirmative action constitutes
racial preference for "no reason other than race or ethnic origin"' 152 and "reverse
discrimination against whites"; and (3) whites are innocent victims who should not
bear the burdens of affirmative action.'53 The second set of premises supports the
application of strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases: (4) whites have also been
victims of discrimination and there is no principled way of distinguishing between
the discrimination experienced by whites and blacks;' 54 and (5) equal protection
must mean the same thing when applied to whites and to blacks.'55 Lastly, the
14' Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581-82 (2009).
' Ian F. Haney Lopez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59
STAN. L. REV. 985, 1029 (2007).
151 "[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to
individual worth." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
152 "Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination
for its own sake." Id. at 307.
153 "[Tlhere is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's position to bear the
burdens of redressing grievances not of their making." Id. at 298, 307, 310.
"' "[The white 'majority' itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to
a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.... There is no
principled basis for deciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which
would not." Id. at 265, 287.
"' "[Tihe guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection it
is not equal." Id. at 289-90.
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Court has reached two conclusions about what constitutes a compelling
government interest: (6) remedying past societal discrimination is too "amorphous"
and is not a compelling government interest; 156 and (7) diversity is a compelling
government interest.' 57 I will explore each of these assumptions, premises, and
conclusions in turn. I will also test their validity by weighing each of Powell's
assertions against the historical record presented above.
A. Three Assumptions About Affirmative Action: Stigma, Racial
Preference, and White Innocence
1. Increased Stigma Borne by People of Color Is a Proper
Argument Against Affirmative Action158
Justices of the Supreme Court have regularly voiced concern about the
possibility that affirmative action increases the stigma borne by African-
Americans. In Bakke, Justice Powell stated, "preferential programs may only
reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve
success without special protection." '159 Relying on Justice Powell's reasoning, in
Croson Justice O'Connor concluded, "[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger
of stigmatic harm.... [T]hey may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and
lead to a politics of racial hostility."16
Justice Thomas has been the Court's most eloquent spokesman on the harms
of stigma in several opinions spanning nearly twenty years. In Adarand, Justice
Thomas stated that affirmative action programs "stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that
they are 'entitled' to preferences." '161 In Grutter, Justice Thomas wrote that the
"majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and
because of [affirmative action] all are tarred as undeserving." '162 And in his lengthy
156 "[R]emedying the effects of 'societal discrimination,' [is] an amorphous concept of injury that may
be ageless in its reach into the past" and is not a compelling government interest." Id. at 307, 310.
157 Id. at 314-15.
158 "[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to
individual worth." Id. at 298.
59 Id. at 298.
"6 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
161 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
162 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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concurrence in Fisher, Thomas wrote that affirmative action "taints the
accomplishments of all of those who are admitted as a result of racial
discrimination."'
163
Stigma, according to these opinions, is the attribution of various demeaning
stereotypes to African-American students. Justice Powell worries about
reinforcement of the belief that blacks cannot achieve success without "special
protection." Justice Thomas worries that affirmative action programs stamp
minorities with a "badge of inferiority" and that all blacks will be "tarred as
undeserving," their accomplishments tainted. It is striking that neither justice says
anything about who holds and purveys these stereotypes. It is as though the
stereotypes just float freely in space.
If affirmative action increases the demeaning stereotypes inflicted upon
African-American students, it is important to realize that the stigma and the
demeaning stereotypes are already there, carried by the mostly white students and
staffs of majority-white institutions.1 4 According to sociologist Joe Feagin,
For most whites and many other non-black Americans, specific antiblack views
are part of a broader racial framing of U.S. society.... [T]his dominant white-
created framing of society includes racial stereotypes, images, emotions,
interpretations, and other important elements that legitimate discrimination....
Persisting antiblack attitudes, images and emotions today ... are the pervasive
and continuing legacy of the material exploitation and racist framing of slavery
and segregation. 1
65
Further evidence of the pervasiveness of these stereotypes comes from the most
recent findings of studies on implicit bias, according to which "approximately 75
percent of Americans display implicit (automatic) preference for White relative to
Black."' 66
163 133 S. Ct. at 2432.
164 See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA 97 (2010) [hereinafter FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA].
165 Id.
166 MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE
208 (2013).
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In majority white educational institutions, these "common stereotypes" are
pervasive. 167 In a study of the environment at the University of Michigan, students
of color reported that the central interracial difficulties they encountered with white
peers included "racial stereotyping (on both academic and behavioral dimensions),
exclusion or marginalization from interaction with white peers, pressure to
assimilate and to deny one's group identity, [and] white resentment about the
supposedly unmerited gains of affirmative action." 168 One African-American
student reported the following interaction with his professor:
When I went to pick up my exam in math class, the professor didn't look as if he
knew exactly who I was, but he automatically found the paper with the lowest
grade and handed it to me. I told him that that was not my name and not my
paper. When I told him my name and he found my paper, my actual score on the
exam was perfect. 1
69
While students of color reported more positive relations with the predominantly
white faculty, the study concluded that "patterns of racial relations between
students of color and the faculty and between these students and white students
often mirror or reinforce one another.
170
The Justices' concern about the potential of affirmative action programs to
reinforce these stereotypes invites an important observation. The conscious or
unconscious will to stigmatize and the imagery of inferiority precede the attribution
of demeaning stereotypes. The "common stereotypes" of blacks as incapable of
success, inferior, or undeserving precede affirmative action programs. These
common stereotypes are already part of our culture, widely held and believed by
the public.'71
167 E. ZAMANI-GALLAHER ET AL., THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON CAMPUS 23, 26 (2010)
("[Tihe White counterparts of these successful achievers may assume that these African Americans
received their positions solely because of race and not because of their intelligence, skill, talent and/or
creativity."); MARK CHESLER ET AL., CHALLENGING RACISM IN HIGHER EDUCATION 102-03, 110-11
(2005) (black student reporting that "[t]here's no way to convince whites we belong here").
168 CHESLER ET AL., supra note 167, at 101-02.
169 Id. at 114.
70 Id. at 118.
... FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 85 ("These racist arguments about contemporary
intelligence levels are grounded in nearly 400 years of viewing black Americans and some other
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There has never been a time in American history when a majority of white
Americans did not stigmatize African-Americans.17 While it is beyond the scope
of this Article to explore this idea in detail, I will give a few examples. The
inferiority of Africans was asserted as a reason, a necessary fiction, to justify their
enslavement. 173 Thomas Jefferson speculated about the lesser intelligence of
blacks, while at the same time discounting and disparaging evidence of the
intellectual accomplishments of Phyllis Wheatley, Benjamin Banneker, and
others. 174 During the Jim Crow era, African-Americans were deemed unfit by law
to attend school with white children or to marry white partners.175 During World
War II, the military was segregated due to white beliefs of the inferiority of
blacks.' 76 After World War II, regardless of their accomplishments or means,
blacks were deemed unfit to reside in white neighborhoods. 177
What is important about all of these examples, and there are many more that
could be recited, is that they all precede anything we could label affirmative action.
The will to stigmatize blacks and to attribute inferiority to blacks has always been
an important aspect of white culture in the United States. 178 Just as the will to
stigmatize and demean blacks long preceded affirmative action, so will it long
continue regardless of whether affirmative action ends or not. The life of those
"common stereotypes" has been, and continues to be, remarkably long and robust.
Americans of color a having an intelligence inferior to that of white Americans."); ZAMANI-GALLAHER,
supra note 167, at 32-33.
172 ZAMANI-GALLAHER, supra note 167, at 32-33.
173 See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT 23-38 (1995);
EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM 327-28 (1975).
114 See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XV (1787), reprinted in JUAN F. PEREA
ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 105-10 (2007) [hereinafter
PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES].
17s See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that laws mandating school
segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down
criminal laws penalizing intermarriage between the races).
176 See, e.g., PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES, supra note 174, at 159-62.
177 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
178 In the matter of stereotypes, W.E.B. Du Bois had it right, describing the need of white Southerners to
disparage black success during Reconstruction: "[U]nfortunately there was one thing that the white
South feared more than negro dishonesty, ignorance, and incompetency, and that was negro honesty,
knowledge and efficiency." W.E.B. DU BOIS, RECONSTRUCTION AND ITS BENEFITS (1910), reprinted in
PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES, supra note 174, at 145.
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Common and widely believed stereotypes of black inferiority are a form of
white racism. 179 It is easy to demonstrate that any increase in demeaning
stereotypes attributable to affirmative action is but another form of white racism.
While affirmative action for blacks allegedly increases demeaning stereotypes
about blacks, note that racial preferences for whites generate no stigma at all. There
are many preferences in academic admissions enjoyed primarily by whites, such as
preferences for legacy admits, certain geographical origins, athletes, and
qualifications like standardized tests that privilege whites. 180 None of these
preferences, however, become the objects of criticism or stigmatization of whites.
Perhaps most egregiously, the naked racial preferences enjoyed by whites and
denied to blacks in opportunities for education, home ownership, employment, and
wealth, amply documented above, yield absolutely no demeaning stereotypes or
stigma for whites." 1 On the contrary, racial preferences for whites are re-
characterized as the earned result of hard work and superior merit. The obvious
double standard at play here-the attribution of demeaning stereotypes to blacks
when a program assists them, contrasted with the attribution of praiseworthy
characteristics rather than stigma to whites when numerous programs assist them-
shows the racist character of the differential attributions.
Offering stigma as a reason to oppose affirmative action is, then, remarkably
self-serving for whites. White racism, in the form of commonly held demeaning
stereotypes about blacks, is offered as a reason why measures designed to remedy
the effects of that racism should not be adopted. In other words, continuing white
racism is asserted as a reason for denying a remedy for white racism.
In addition to being self-serving for whites, there is no reason to think that the
elimination of affirmative action will reduce the commonly held stereotypes
attributed to blacks. The reduction of stigma argument, in addition to being self-
serving, is empirically wrong. The elimination of affirmative action will not
suddenly yield an appreciation for the qualifications and deserved admissions of
179 See TIM J. WISE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACIAL PREFERENCE IN BLACK AND WHITE 128 (2005).
180 Id. at 79-81, 122 ("Nationally, anywhere from twelve to twenty-five percent of each freshmen class
at top schools will be filled by the children of alumni, which is far more than the number admitted
because of so-called racial preference for people of color.").
11 d at 127-28.
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black students. Rather, the evidence shows that the elimination of affirmative
action actually increases hostility towards African-American students.182
If affirmative action increases the stigma inflicted upon African-American
students, this is another way of saying that white people resent the presence of
blacks in presumptively white environments. Blacks deal with such hostility all the
time."8 3 There is no reason why African-American students cannot evaluate the
presence of or increase in stigma for themselves. 18 There is no reason why black
students cannot make their own informed decisions about what is best for
themselves: whether the degree of hostility in a majority-white environment is
worth tolerating. The argument that increased stigma should result in curtailing
affirmative action seems to rest on the idea that black students are incapable of
deciding what is in their best interest.1 8 5 Any argument that rests on presumed
black incapacity is itself a racist assumption about the lesser capabilities of
blacks. 186 A much better response to the possibility of increased stigma faced by
black students is to make campuses healthier environments for black students by
reducing the propensity of white students and faculty to stereotype black students
negatively.
2. Affirmative Action Constitutes "Racial Preference" for
Blacks and "Reverse Discrimination" Against Whites1 8 7
Many justices of the Supreme Court assume that affirmative action constitutes
"racial preference" for blacks and/or "reverse discrimination" against whites. In
Bakke, Justice Powell wrote that "preferring members of any one group for no
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.",8 8 Justice
..2 Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning
Affirmative Action, 85 INDIANA L.J. 1497 (2010).
183 JOE R. FEAGIN ET AL., THE AGONY OF EDUCATION: BLACK STUDENTS AT WHITE COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES x-xi, 7, 13 (1996) ("Because of the negative climate at many predominantly white
colleges, very difficult, painful choices are forced on African American students and parents.").
18 Cf WISE, supra note 179, at 125-26.
185 Id. at 126.
186 Id.
87 "If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular
group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected....
Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for
its own sake." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307, 319.
188 Id.
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O'Connor relied on this language in her opinions in Croson and in Grutter.
1 9
Justice Scalia, concurring in Croson, wrote that "the benign purpose of
compensating for social disadvantages ... can [not] be pursued by the illegitimate
means of racial discrimination. ... Where injustice is the game, however, turnabout
is not fair play."'19 During oral argument in Shelby v. Holder, Justice Scalia
described the Voting Rights Act as a "perpetuation of racial entitlements."'19'
Describing the University of Michigan Law School's admissions program, Justice
Thomas wrote that "racial discrimination is not a permissible solution to the self-
inflicted wounds of this elitist admissions policy." '192 Most recently, describing a
school district's use of race to maintain desegregation, Chief Justice Roberts
famously wrote, "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."' 93 The idea also enjoys wide popularity in the
public. 194
A remedy for proven discrimination, however, is not a preference of any kind.
I have argued that the strongest justification for affirmative action is as a remedy
for proven federally-subsidized race discrimination in education and housing and
the economic consequences of that discrimination. Remedies for proven inequality
are not preferences. The pervasive white racism of the World War II era constituted
discrimination solely based on race. A remedy for this discrimination suffered by
black Americans is not "preferring members of any one group for no reason other
than race." We do not ordinarily consider remedies for injuries to be "preferences"
granted to the victims of injuries. Remedies seek to "make [the victims] whole for
injuries suffered" because of discrimination.' 95 In some cases, the Court has
approved of race-based remedies for proven discrimination without discounting
them as simple "racial preferences." '196
' Id. at 496; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323.
190 Croson, 488 U.S. at 520, 524.
191 Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia: Reauthorized Voting Rights Act was a 'perpetuation of racial
entitlement,' ABA JOURNAL (Feb. 28, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://www.abajoumal.com.
192 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
193 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
194 FEAGiN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 124; Michael Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites
See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCl. 215 (2011).
" Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
196 See Franks, 424 U.S. at 763; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 463-67.
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Even if one is to consider such a remedy a "racial preference," it is both
interesting and highly misleading that the only "racial preferences" currently
debated in the courts and in the public are those that provide some benefit to
blacks. It is whites, however, not blacks, who are the true beneficiaries of racial
preferences. Consider the massive economic and educational benefits unjustly
gained by whites because of pervasive, federally subsidized racism in the G.I. Bill.
These benefits gained by whites were the result of the outright, pervasive anti-black
racism of whites. White veterans were preferred in education, housing, lending, and
employment solely because they were white. Blacks were denied access to these
benefits solely because they were black. In contrast to these enormously
consequential gains whites received because of racial preferences for whites, the
benefits that blacks and other historically underrepresented minorities receive as a
result of affirmative action are modest indeed.
In the United States, most whites "incorrectly believe that African-Americans
are as well off or better off than the average white."' 97 The facts tell a very different
story; there is no significant area of life in which whites do not constitute the most
privileged group in society. Whites are the most privileged group in access to
health care, education, jobs, income, housing, and wealth, just to name a few
significant areas.198 White families enjoy the highest median net worth of all the
racial groups, a net worth that is 22 times the median net worth of black families,
an economic benefit that results directly from white racism.'99 The average black
family earns an income that is less than two-thirds the income of the average white
family. 200 The average white person has a life expectancy that is four to six years
longer than the average African-American.2 1 Black Americans are "twice as likely
as whites to be unemployed, three times more likely to live in poverty, and more
than six times as likely to be incarcerated. 20
2
Whites also enjoy significant racial preferences in higher education. Of all the
racial groups, whites are the most likely to be admitted to their first choices of
" BLENDON ET AL., supra note 10, at 66.
198 Id.
199 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TABLE 1, MEDIAN VALUE OF ASSETS FOR
HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE OF ASSET OWNED AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 2010 (2012); OLIVER &
SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 2.
200 FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 21.
201 Id.
202 NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 2009, at 1-2 (2009).
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college or university.2°3 White students also enjoy disproportionate privilege at
institutions that admit legacies, the children of alumni. "There are far more legacy
admissions than there are students who benefit from affirmative action." 2°4 For
example, at Ivy League schools 96% of living alumni are white, meaning that at
these schools the overwhelming majority of legacy admits will be white.205 At
these and other top schools, the children of alumni constitute between twelve to
25% of each entering class, a number that far exceeds the number admitted because
of affirmative action.21  In addition, preferences awarded by admissions
committees for attendance at the most academically challenging schools, for taking
advanced courses, and for participation in interesting extracurricular activities will
all disproportionately favor white students, who disproportionately inhabit the
wealthy, mostly segregated neighborhoods that are able to support such schools.
20 7
Whites are disproportionately over-represented in institutions of higher
learning. In recent years, among students matriculating at selective colleges, whites
constituted 78 percent of students, contrasted with blacks (8 percent), Latinos (4
percent), and Asians (11 percent).20 8 In postgraduate education, whites constitute
70.3 percent of students, compared with 21.5 percent of students who are black or
Latino.209 In law school enrollments, whites constitute 77 percent of the students,
compared with 15.3 percent of students who are black and Latino. 210 In medical
schools, whites constitute 60.2 percent of the students, compared to 7 percent of
students who are black and 8.9 percent who are Latino. 21 1 In most college,
203 WISE, supra note 179, at 72.
204 d at 122.
205 Id
206 Id.; Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action. Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal,
84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 995 (1996).
207 WISE, supra note 179, at 80-81, 123-24. Blacks only represent 6% of the students attending the
country's most affluent high schools (which will often be the most challenging), while whites constitute
84% of such students. Id. at 80.
208 THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, No LONGER SEPARATE, NOT YET
EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND CAMPUS LIFE 139-40, 174-75 (2009).
209 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, FAST FACTS (2012),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=98.
20 See Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legaleducation/resources/statistics (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
21 Asian/Pacific Islander students constitute 22.8 percent of medical school students, a number
disproportionately high compared to their percentage of the population. FACTS: Applicants,
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graduate, and professional school classrooms, all one needs to do is to look around
to see that the majority of students are white. How can it be said that blacks get
racial preferences in education when our institutions of higher education remain
overwhelmingly and disproportionately white?
The disproportionate representation of whites in institutions of higher
education shows the falsity of the term "reverse discrimination" when referring to
whites who are not admitted to their most desired schools. The disproportionately
large representation of whites at most institutions shows that decisions not to admit
certain whites is not because of their race. Rather, it is because their qualifications
are less desirable than those of all the other whites who are admitted. Whereas the
discrimination against blacks has been based solely on their race and skin color,
one cannot say the same of alleged discrimination against whites. When nonwhite
race is used as a plus factor to admit a black or Latino student, this act does not
constitute discrimination against a white because of the race of the white person. It
is simply that, in a context that includes more highly qualified whites, the rejected
whites ranked lower. In a world of limited opportunities, disproportionate numbers
of more qualified whites were preferred. In such a world, the fact that petitioners
are white has not hurt them; it has simply not benefitted them in comparison to all
the other whites who were admitted. This is not race discrimination at all in the
sense that race discrimination is suffered by blacks and Latinos.
Accordingly, it is very misleading to describe the rejection of white applicants
as "reverse discrimination." Such rejections carry none of the meanings of racial
inferiority that characterizes the discrimination experienced by blacks and Latinos.
It is just as misleading to characterize affirmative action, a remedy for past
discrimination against blacks, as "racial preference" for blacks. It was always
intended to be, and remains, a remedy for race discrimination against them.
3. Whites Are "Innocent Victims" of Affirmative Action212
The rhetoric of white innocence and white victimization has played an
important part in the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. In Bakke, Justice
Powell wrote "there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in
respondent's position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their
Matriculants, Enrollment, Graduates, MD/PhD, and Residency Applicants Data, ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, https://www.aamc.org/data/facts/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
212 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298. "[T]here is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's
position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making." Id.
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making. 2 13 In Wygant, Powell wrote "[a]s part of this Nation's dedication to
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear
some of the burden of the remedy. '214 In Croson, Justice O'Connor thought that the
narrow tailoring of an affirmative action program was necessary "to assure that it
will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the
benefit."21 5 In the same opinion, Justice Scalia wrote, "even 'benign' racial quotas
have individual victims, whose very real injustice we ignore whenever we deny
them enforcement of their right not to be disadvantaged on the basis of race." '216
Whites are thus "innocent persons" or "individual victims" who bear the "burden,"
"harm," or "injustice" of affirmative action. Through its frequent reference to the
concept, the Court has encouraged widespread belief, across the ideological
spectrum, in white innocence and victimization. 217
There are several interesting aspects of the Court's use of the concept of
"white innocence." First, there is no definition of what the Court means by
"innocence." Innocence of what? Of racism against blacks? Of responsibility for
the deprivations faced by many black candidates for admission to school or
employment? It seems to mean something like "contemporary Whites are not
responsible or blameworthy for the history and legacy of racism in American
society. '218 Still, it is noteworthy that the Court, by never defining what it means
by innocence, nor to whom it applies, leaves the concept vague and subject to
broad interpretations.
Second, the Court simply assumes that whites in affirmative action cases are
innocent. The concept of white innocence, and evidence in support of and against
the concept, is never discussed or evaluated in any of the affirmative action cases.
The Court simply assumes that whites are innocent. Yet many non-white persons,
and some whites, in light of the racism and its consequences as described above,
would not consider contemporary whites to be "innocent" in the sense that the
213 Id.
214 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1986) (Powell, J., opinion).
215 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
216 Croson, 488 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Johnson v. Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616,
657-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217 5 RONALD J. Fiscus, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 7 (1992); see Cecil J.
Hunt, II, The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the Constitutional Rhetoric of White
Innocence, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 477, 531 (2006) [hereinafter Hunt, White Innocence].
218 Hunt, White Innocence, supra note 217, at 533.
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Court seems to mean.21 9 The Court seems to take judicial notice of "white
innocence," even though any such innocence is contestable. 22° It seems particularly
inappropriate to assume "white innocence" in a court of law, where determinations
of innocence or guilt always depend on evidence. On what basis, other than wishful
thinking, does the Court decide that whites are "innocent?"
In the Court's view, innocence applies only to whites. In her opinion in
Grutter, Justice O'Connor would only approve an affirmative action program that
worked "the least harm possible to ... innocent persons competing for the same
benefit. '2 1 She approved of Michigan Law School's affirmative action program
because its individualized consideration "does not unduly harm nonminority
applicants. ' 222 These references make clear Justice O'Connor's primary concern
for minimizing harm to "nonminority applicants," i.e., white people.
This exclusive identification of innocence and harm suffered with whiteness
has troubling implications in the affirmative action cases. The Court assumes that
all whites are innocent. But the Court also assumes that all innocents are white. The
Court makes innocence and whiteness coextensive. If whites are "innocent" and
harmed by affirmative action, then by implication blacks and other nonwhites who
benefit from affirmative action must be "guilty" of causing harm to whites. Yet
considering the degree and pervasiveness of racism against blacks, amply
documented above, it is hard to understand why blacks are not considered innocent
and at least as deserving as whites. 223
Under the varied rationales for affirmative action, it does not seem reasonable
to conclude that black students are somehow victimizing whites. Independent of
affirmative action, many black students are admitted based on their numerical and
other qualifications. The fact that whites with mediocre qualifications compared to
other whites are not admitted does not give rise to any legitimate claim of
victimization. I have argued that the strongest basis for affirmative action is as a
remedy for past discrimination against blacks as a group. A remedy for past
victimization cannot fairly be understood as itself a form of victimization, even if
some persons are inconvenienced. Affirmative action can also be understood as
219 Id. at 523-24.
220 Id. at 523.
221 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
222 Id. at 309.
223 See generally Hunt, White Innocence, supra note 217.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) 9 DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.344
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE 1 620 I VOL. 75 I 2014
corrective, in the sense of correcting for racial disparities in numerical
qualifications that have their genesis in racism. It can be seen as a way to make
things more right. Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, affirmative action
admissions can be understood as necessary for diversity and its educational benefits
in university communities. Lastly, under concepts of distributive justice, the
admission of blacks can be understood as constitutive of their fair share of
educational opportunities. 224 In none of these instances can black candidates fairly
be seen as victimizing or injuring whites. Admitted black students are merely
taking their share of a finite number of seats in the class.
If black students are not victimizing innocent whites, then the only "guilty"
victimizers left are university administrators. University administrators who engage
in affirmative action, and probably many who do not, are merely trying to assemble
the most qualified and diverse classes they can. There seems to be neither an
intention nor a result on the part of admissions officers to victimize or disadvantage
whites. The fact that whites are enrolled in disproportionate numbers in colleges
and graduate schools throughout the country demonstrates that there is no
victimization of whites because they are white.
225
The Court also assumes that affirmative action programs harm innocent
whites. Harm or injury in the context of affirmative action means the loss of a
benefit or an opportunity to which the injured plaintiff would have been entitled but
for the affirmative action programs at issue. It is important to recognize that no one,
regardless of scores or other criteria, is entitled to be admitted to most educational
institutions. In order to demonstrate harm, white plaintiffs would have to show that,
but for affirmative action, they would have been admitted to the schools to which
they applied.
The generalized claims of white innocence made by the Court and believed by
many whites are seriously weakened by the fact that white baby boomers and their
children have received great financial and educational benefits from the federally-
subsidized racism of the recent past. While whites may be unaware of these and
other unearned benefits their whiteness, their lack of awareness does not change the
fact that they received enormous benefits from government-sponsored racism.
White baby boomers typically inherit an average of $125,000 at age 55.226 The
224 FISCUS, supra note 217, at 8.
'5 See supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
226 MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 78; see OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 155-56.
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corresponding figure for black baby boomers is only $16,000, only one-ninth the
inheritance of whites.227 These inheritance figures correspond to the numbers on
median net worth, which for whites is $110,729 and for blacks only $4,955 .228
Since home equity constitutes about 60% of net worth,229 the proportion of white
net worth attributable to racism is substantial.
The huge majority of today's high school, college, and graduate school
students are the children of baby boomers. The children of white baby boomers
have benefitted directly from the racism-generated home ownership that has
produced such wealth from the 1950s to the present. These white children have
benefitted not just from that enormous wealth but also from all of the enhanced
educational and financial opportunities that high net worth provides: better
neighborhoods, better financed and higher-quality schools, more opportunities for
extracurricular activities and enrichment, and far greater financial and institutional
support for standardized test preparation and for college applications. 23 ' All of
these factors, of course, increase the grade point averages, the standardized test
scores, the number of advanced courses, and the overall attractiveness of the
academic dossiers that these students present to college admissions committees.
The claim of white innocence under these circumstances reduces to a claim of
being potentially unknowing beneficiaries of unjust enrichment produced by
government and private racism. Most whites, both baby boomers and their children,
should be considered beneficiaries of unjust enrichment. As such they have no
valid claim of entitlement to the fruits of the unjust enrichment.23 1 As one example,
"the family of an embezzler who occupies a house or possesses goods purchased
with stolen funds is not considered to have a normatively secure claim to the goods
merely because they did not actively perpetuate the wrong." '232 As another example,
"personal guilt or innocence is irrelevant to the claim of right, as when a party
227 MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 78; see OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 155-56.
228 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TABLE 1, MEDIAN VALUE OF ASSETS FOR
HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE OF ASSET OWNED AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 2010 (2012); OLIVER &
SHAPIRO, supra note 112 at 2.
229 McKENNA, supra note 44, at 76-77; see OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 148-50.
230 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 2; THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING
AFRICAN AMERICAN: How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 3 (2004).
231 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1709, 1774 n.286 (1993).
232 ld.
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innocently comes into possession of stolen goods; the claim on those goods by the
rightful owner is not forfeited because of the innocence of the current possessor. 23
3
This is why, in the affirmative action context, claims of white innocence are
quite weak. Whites have no valid entitlement to the fruits of racism. Racism
produced the better neighborhoods and school districts and better preparation and
consequently higher standardized test scores that continue to advantage whites and
disadvantage blacks and Latinos. 234 Whites are the beneficiaries of unjust
educational enrichment. Definitions of qualification for college admission or
employment that privilege these measures of unjust educational enrichment
continue to confer unearned rewards on already unfairly advantaged whites.
235
Whites who gain admission because of higher average numerical standards are
being further rewarded for the racism that produced their educational privilege. As
beneficiaries of unjust enrichment, whites who claim to be innocent victims, or the
Court that claims such status for them, stand on weak ground.
It is remarkable that the Supreme Court assumes that all whites are innocent
victims of affirmative action programs. These presumptions seem even more
remarkable when we consider that the Court places this mantle of innocence and
victimization upon the plaintiffs in the leading affirmative action cases, most
(perhaps all) of whom would have been denied admission in the absence of
affirmative action. Alan Bakke, for example, despite excellent numerical
credentials was rejected by all twelve medical schools to which he applied.2 36 His
age at the time of his application, 33, was old relative to most applicants and may
have been a factor in his consistent rejections.2 37 Bakke applied to UC Davis twice
and was rejected twice.23 8 The first time he was rejected principally because he
applied late in the admissions cycle, after most seats in the class had been filled. 239
233 FISCUS, supra note 217, at 45.
234 See supra notes 80-133 and accompanying text.
235 See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1631 (2003) ("[S]tandardized
tests are retained for the convenience of the schools even though they privilege applicants from well-to-
do families, alumni children, and those born into celebrity.").
236 JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 16
(1979).
237 id.
23 Id. at 21, 29.
239 Id. at 21.
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The second time he was rejected because he had an unsatisfactory interview with a
UC Davis faculty member, who concluded that Bakke was "a rather rigidly
oriented young man who has the tendency to arrive at conclusions based more upon
his personal impressions than upon thoughtful processes using available sources of
information."240 Bakke's overall lack of qualifications is made clearer by the facts
that many applicants with scores higher than his were not admitted and several
other white students with scores lower than his were admitted to the UC Davis
medical school class.24' In addition, the dean of the medical school had as many as
five discretionary admits for children of alumni or donors who otherwise would not
be admitted.
2 42
Most, if not all, of the other plaintiffs in more recent cases would also have
been rejected, with or without affirmative action. Regarding Barbara Grutter,
counsel for the University of Michigan stated during oral argument that "[t]he
record evidence would indicate ... that Barbara Grutter would not have been
admitted under a race-blind program. '243 In the companion case to Grutter, Jennifer
Gratz was described as "well qualified [but] less competitive than the students who
ha[d] been admitted on first review."'2' And regarding Abigail Fisher, the named
plaintiff in Fisher v. Texas, the University of Texas affirmed that "the undisputed
evidence demonstrated that Fisher would not have been offered fall admission. '245
Plaintiffs Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher, all of whom were less competitive than
all the other whites who were admitted, suffered no injury due to affirmative action
since they would not have been admitted in its absence. Notwithstanding their lack
of qualifications, the Court still cloaked them in the status of innocent victims.
Alan Bakke, however, rather than being an innocent victim, illustrates how a white
candidate benefits from racism and unearned white privilege.2 46 As a young man,
Bakke benefitted directly from Jim Crow segregation by attending an all-white,
240 Id. at 29.
241 Id. at 20, 29-30.
242 Id. at 24, 42-43.
243 Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
244 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
245 Brief for Respondent at 13-14 n.6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2012) (No. 11-
345).
246 See WISE, supra note 179, at 74-77.
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segregated school in Dade County, Florida.2 47 The quality of education he received
likely contributed to his success and his high test scores. This quality of education
was denied outright to his black counterparts in Jim Crow Florida. When the
Supreme Court ordered Bakke admitted to UC Davis solely on the basis of his test
scores, they conferred upon him yet another unearned benefit of white racism.
248
In the end, then, the claim of innocent white victimization underlying many of
the affirmative action cases falls flat. The claim of innocence is seriously weakened
by the unearned advantage that racism gave, and continues to give, to whites.
Whites are not entitled to the fruits of racism, nor are they presumptively entitled to
admission at their schools of choice. If we take into account the distribution of
opportunities that would exist in a world free of racism, then "questions of
innocence and blame are fundamentally irrelevant in affirmative action cases, and
the controlling question is one of equity.
' 249
B. The Premises Supporting Application of Strict Scrutiny:
Historical Discrimination Against Whites and the "Same"
Equal Protection
1. Whites Too Have Suffered a History of Discrimination
and There Is No Principled Way to Distinguish Between
the Experiences of Whites and Blacks250
Justice Powell posits that the United States is a "nation of minorities"251 in
which each ethnic minority can "lay claim to a history of prior discrimination" by
the State and private individuals. He describes how each ethnic minority "had to
struggle-and to some extent struggles still" to overcome prejudice. 252 Powell is
247 DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 236, at 15.
248 WISE, supra note 179, at 76.
249 FISCUS, supra note 217, at 45. Under principles of distributive justice and in the absence of racism,
each racial group's fair share of opportunities would match its proportion of the population.
Accordingly, the disproportionately large share of opportunities held by whites is excessive and unfair
to racial minorities. Racial minorities should enjoy their fair, proportional share of educational and
economic opportunities. See id. at 45, 47.
250 "[T]he white 'majority' itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to
a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.... There is no
principled basis for deciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which
would not." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295-96.
251 d. at 292.
252 Id.
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clearly referring only to white ethnic groups, since he cites only immigration
histories as evidence of the discrimination suffered by European immigrants.
25 3
In Powell's view, both white ethnics and blacks have suffered discrimination,
rendering the groups similarly situated and their experiences indistinguishable.
Powell is thus relying on classic, but outdated, notions of ethnicity. According to
ethnicity theory, "contemporary race relations should be understood as the
competition between similarly situated ethnic groups comprised of individuals
bound together by shared cultures."254 Ethnicity theory minimizes the role of
racism, present and structural, in impeding the progress and possibilities of racial
minorities.
255
Yet Powell's assertions are plainly wrong, since the experiences of white
ethnics and blacks are easily distinguishable.2 56 The fair-skinned European
immigrants who faced discrimination upon their arrival in the United States were
allowed to become white.2 57 They consider themselves white and are considered
white by others.25 As whites, they benefit from white privileges. 9 The history of
the G.I. Bill shows that its public and private administrators were well able to
distinguish between whites and blacks for the purpose of excluding blacks from the
educational and economic benefits received almost exclusively by whites of all
ethnicities.26 °
Everyone knows, at some level, that the experiences of blacks and whites are
not, and never have been, the same in this country. Some members of the Court
have recognized to some degree the extreme material inequality suffered by
blacks. 261 Consider a hypothetical. Imagine a space traveler from another planet
253 See id at 292 nn.30-33.
254 Lopez, supra note 150, at 1023.
255 Id. at 1022-23.
25 6 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387.
257 JOE R. FEAGtN, THE WHITE RACIAL FRAME: CENTURIES OF RACIAL FRAMING AND COUNTER-
FRAMING 82-83 (2009) (describing how poor Irish immigrants came to be accepted as white).
258 Id.
259 Id.
26 See supra notes 36-133 and accompanying text.
261 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387-402 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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who happened to visit and study the United States.262 This space traveler, observing
the distribution of material and societal resources between whites and blacks would
have no difficulty observing the obvious: that whites control a disproportionately
large amount of social resources and that blacks are far less privileged.263 The truth
of the privileged status of whites can be demonstrated another way. Suppose white
people were offered a chance to become black. Very few, if any, whites would
choose to become black. Yet if whites and blacks were truly the same in
circumstances and social meanings, there would be no major disincentive
associated with being black. When political scientist Andrew Hacker asked white
college students how much compensation they would seek if they suddenly became
black, most white students responded that "it would not be out of place to ask for
$50 million, or $1 million for each coming black year. ' 264 The desire of whites to
remain white, and to seek huge bounties in order to live as blacks, is a tacit
admission of the privileged status of whites.
Powell's discussion of discrimination simply negates the racial history of the
United States. In his discussion, he refers in detail only to discrimination suffered
by white ethnics, with no reference to race discrimination against blacks.
2 65
Throughout his opinion, he gives only a cursory reference to the nation's "legacy of
slavery and racial discrimination" and to the "continued exclusion of Negroes from
the mainstream of American society. ' '266 In contrast, Justice Marshall's powerful
dissent in Bakke reminds us that "during most of the past 200 years, the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and
pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro. '2 67 Marshall's dissent
chronicles the history and severity of discrimination against blacks and relies upon
the rich body of historical research documenting slavery, Jim Crow, and their
present legacies.2 68 It is striking that Justice Powell ignores entirely Justice
262 Cf Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 23 (2011); Derrick Bell,
Political Reality Testing: 1993, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1033 (1993); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 158-60 (1992) (chronicle of the space traders).
263 BELL, supra note 262, at 158-60.
264 FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 222.
263 See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 388 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing several histories documenting African American history).
266 Id. at 294 (majority opinion).
267 Id. at 387 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268 See, e.g., id at 388 n.1.
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Marshall's dissent, the historical literature on slavery and Jim Crow, and the facts
of that race discrimination itself
Powell's statements equating the discrimination experienced by white
ethnicities and blacks leads to his further claim that "[t]here is no principled basis
for deciding which groups merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would
not. '2 69 He cites no authority for this proposition. He prefers to rely only on his
own personal understanding of race relations in reaching that conclusion.
The claim that there is no principled basis for distinguishing between groups
seems clearly incorrect. The principled basis for differentiating between white
ethnicities and blacks for constitutional purposes is the infinitely greater degree and
severity of discrimination suffered by blacks at the hands of whites. In the United
States, the discrimination suffered and still suffered by African-Americans is sui
generis. As stated by Justice Marshall, the "experience of Negroes in America has
been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not
merely the history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as
inferior by the law."'2 70 Even in the more recent post-World War II era, the blatant
racism of most universities, bankers, realtors, and neighborhood associations,
guided and subsidized by the government, caused provable educational and
economic harms suffered to this day by most African-Americans.
The principled basis for distinguishing between whites and blacks lies in the
depth of historical evidence that proves the preferences given to whites, the race
discrimination against blacks, and the present consequences of that race
discrimination. The principled basis denied by Justice Powell is plain and clear: to
provide a remedy for state-subsidized racism and state-produced racial inequality.
The principle is simple and fully consistent with the heart of the Equal Protection
Clause: that discriminatory state action demands a remedy.
Justice Powell asserts that European immigrant whites and blacks have both
suffered discrimination, and that there is no principled way to distinguish between
them. It is logically necessary for him to assert that white ethnics and blacks have
suffered similarly from discrimination to reach the conclusion that distinctions
between whites and blacks have "no principled basis." These propositions become
foundations for two important conclusions in the affinative action cases: that
whites and blacks are similarly situated with respect to the Equal Protection Clause;
269 Id. at 296 (majority opinion).
27 Id. at 400-01 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and that strict scrutiny is appropriate in analyzing both racially discriminatory
classifications and corrective affirmative action classifications.
27 1
Historical evidence shows that white ethnics and blacks have not suffered the
same discrimination and are therefore not similarly situated with respect to the
Equal Protection Clause. The difference in the discrimination suffered chiefly by
blacks provides a principled basis for differentiating between white ethnics and
blacks. The historical evidence, therefore, shows that Justice Powell is wrong. The
provable falsity of these key assertions ultimately undermines the whole basis for
finding that strict scrutiny should apply the same in evaluating racially
discriminatory classifications as in evaluating remedial affirmative action
classifications.
2. Equal Protection Must Mean the Same Thing for
Persons of Different Races272
In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote that "the guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to
a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection it is not
equal. '273 These phrases have become a shibboleth in the Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor repeats the phrase in her opinions in Croson,
Grutter, and Adarand.274
Having asserted, against all evidence, that the discrimination suffered by
white ethnics and blacks is indistinguishable, Justice Powell now asserts that equal
protection must be the same for all. This language becomes the foundation for
analyzing all racial classifications using strict scrutiny. The logic is something like
this: since all discrimination is the same, and equal protection must be the same,
then all racial classifications must be treated the same, using strict scrutiny. This
also becomes the conceptual heart of the colorblindness idea, under which all
considerations of race are presumed nefarious and unconstitutional. Under the
colorblindness rationale, classifications involving race that intend to remedy past
271 Id. at 289-90 (majority opinion).
272 Id.; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 494; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323.
273 438 U.S. at 289-90.
274 Croson, 488 U.S. at 494; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218.
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discrimination are treated the same as classifications that themselves discriminate
and injure based on race. 275
It is important to note that Powell's demand for "sameness" in equal
protection only seems to apply to the affirmative action context. Under the Court's
traditional jurisprudence, it is perfectly consistent with equal protection principles
for the state to treat differently situated individuals differently. Thus, opticians can
be treated differently, and less well, than optometrists or ophthalmologists without
offending the Equal Protection Clause.276 New York can deny employment to
recovering addicts taking methadone but permit employment to others arguably
similarly situated, such as recovering alcoholics.2 77 Massachusetts can enact an
employment preference for veterans even when such a preference works to the
extreme disadvantage of women, who constituted a tiny percentage of veterans at
the time.
278
The Court has also held that persons and groups can be treated differently as a
remedy for past discrimination. In Franks v. Bowman, for example, the Court
approved of the award of competitive seniority as a remedy for past discrimination
in hiring.279 This resulted in unequal treatment for whites and blacks because
affected "innocent whites" had to suffer certain negative economic effects from
displacement of their seniority. 280 And in United States v. Paradise, the Court
approved a court-ordered promotion quota that required the promotion of one black
police officer for each white policeman promoted.281 In addition, the Court
approved of quotas for promotions such that the number of black officers in each
rank would number 25 percent, the percentage of blacks in the relevant labor
market.28 2 The Court has also allowed a woman to be promoted rather than a man
in a traditionally gender-segregated workplace. 28
3
275 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 n.34.
276 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
277 N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
278 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
279 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
280 Id. at 777.
2 1 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
282 Id. at 179-80.
283 Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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Until Adarand, the Court had deferred to federally-mandated economic set-
asides and other remedies for past discrimination. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, the
Court upheld a requirement that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for
local public works projects must be used to procure supplies or services from
businesses owned or controlled by minorities.2" This federal mandate resulted
from a comprehensive national congressional study that found pervasive past and
present race discrimination in the allocation of federal construction money.2 85 The
Court wrote "as a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in the remedial
context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion. '2 86 The Court
approved of this remedy notwithstanding the fact that some white-owned firms,
themselves perhaps innocent of discrimination, might lose some business:
It is not a constitutional defect in this program that it may disappoint the
expectations of nonminority firms. When effectuating a limited and properly
tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such "a sharing of the
burden" by innocent parties is not impermissible.... [I]t was within
congressional power to act on the assumption that in the past some nonminority
businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the virtual
exclusion of minority firms from these contracting opportunities.
287
In Jacobs v. Barr, the court found that a compensatory remedial program for
Japanese-Americans interned during World War II survived an equal protection
challenge by an interned German-American.28 The court analyzed the case under
strict scrutiny and found that the remedial purpose of compensating Japanese-
Americans for their internment was a compelling government interest.
289
These numerous exceptions to the "sameness" of equal treatment demonstrate
that Justice Powell's demand for "sameness" is clearly optional, not necessary.
Powell's concept of sameness shares an eerie similarity with the interpretation of
284 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
285 Id. at 477-78.
286 
Id. at 482.
287 Id. at 484-85.
288 Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
289 Id.
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equal protection the Court gave us in Plessy v. Ferguson.29 ° In Plessy, the Court
found that separate and allegedly equal train cars for whites and blacks constituted
equal protection for both races. The Court ignored that white racism caused the
statutory separation of the races and suggested that harms resulting from racial
segregation were invented by blacks:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction on
it.2
9 1
The Plessy court thus constructed an equal protection in which formally equal law,
or "sameness" of treatment, in fact preserved and promoted massive racial
inequality.
Similarly, Powell's assertion of a requirement of "sameness" in equal
protection preserves and protects the existing distribution of white privilege and
black inequality. A requirement of "sameness" and formally equal treatment locks
in all the effects of past discrimination and makes voluntary remedies for past
discrimination essentially impossible. The Court's rulings in disparate impact
cases, requiring proof of discriminatory intent to establish a violation of equal
protection, also accomplish the same work, making it impossible to redress the
structural legacies of past discrimination.2 92
The "same equal protection" thus equates to the protection of white
educational and economic interests. To strike down or limit affirmative action
because of a need for "sameness" of treatment or putative injury to "innocent"
whites, means that a white person is awarded an opportunity that otherwise would
290 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
291 Id. at 551.
292 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The difficulty in proving discriminatory intent
under the Constitution has generated much recent scholarship. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Erwin
Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Postrace Equal Protection, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 994 (2010) ('This
treatment of constitutional claims ... presumes that disparate outcomes are no longer caused by racism.
It is, in short, another attack on the salience of race.").
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have gone to a person of color. In this way, the Court prefers whites every time it
limits or strikes down affirmative action.
293
C. What Constitutes a Compelling Government Interest?: Past
Societal Discrimination and Diversity
1. Remedying the Effects of Past Societal Discrimination
Is Not A Compelling Government Interest2 94
Since Bakke, the Court has consistently rejected assertions of past societal
discrimination as a compelling government interest warranting relief under the
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Powell's reasoning was that any such justification
was too "amorphous" and potentially "ageless in its reach into the past."2 95 In
Wygant, four justices, reiterating Powell's view, expressed the view that "[s]ocietal
discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially
classified remedy." '296 In Croson, Justice O'Connor wrote that "[1like the claim that
discrimination in primary and secondary schooling justifies a rigid racial preference
in medical school admissions, an amorphous claim that there has been past
discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial
quota. '297 And in Grutter, Justice O'Connor wrote that "Justice Powell rejected an
interest in remedying societal discrimination because such measures would risk
placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties."2 98
Contrary to the Court's rhetoric, the evidence I presented in Part I
demonstrates that past societal discrimination is neither "amorphous" nor "ageless
293 In the related context of employment discrimination, the Court has also expressed its preference for
whites. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (given a choice between the interests of
whites who passed a test for promotion, and the interests of blacks, who were disproportionately
disqualified by the unverified test, the Court preferred the interests of the whites). See Harris & West-
Faulcon, supra note 147.
294 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307, 310 ("Remedying the effects of 'societal discrimination,' [is] an amorphous
concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past" and is not a compelling government
interest.").
295 Id.
296 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
297 Croson, 488 U.S. at 499; see also id. at 520 ("The benign purpose of compensating for social
disadvantages, whether they have been acquired by reason of prior discrimination or otherwise, can no
more be pursued by the illegitimate means of racial discrimination than can other assertedly benign
purposes we have repeatedly rejected.") (Scalia, J., concurring).
29' Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324.
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in its reach into the past." Further compounding the injustice, the Court has
implemented its burden of proving past societal discrimination such as to make
such discrimination essentially impossible to prove, regardless of the quantum or
quality of evidence. The Court's disparate allocation of evidentiary burdens for
white plaintiffs and defendants shows the Court's clear favoritism towards the
claims of whites. Lastly, the Court's hostile, unreceptive attitude towards remedial
claims based on past societal discrimination reveals the Court's agenda to protect
the current educational and economic interests of whites at the expense of blacks
and other minorities.
So the question raised in Bakke, and its progeny, is whether the evidence of
past societal discrimination is an "amorphous concept of injury" or "ageless in its
reach into the past." Since the period for which I present evidence concerning the
enactment and implementation of the G.I. Bill begins with World War II and
extends to the 1960s, it cannot be deemed an "ageless reach into the past." It is
finite, bounded and recent.
Is this evidence of past discrimination too "amorphous" a concept of injury? It
is hard to see what is amorphous about this history. The federal government
adopted the Bill with the intention that it be locally administered, to leave
undisturbed the racist segregation prevalent in both the North and the South.2 99 It
was drafted this way at the behest of southern democratic congressmen who wanted
no federal interference in their regime of segregation.3"0 Federal policy encouraged
and subsidized segregation and homogeneous white neighborhoods.3"'
The racism of the private entities receiving Bill subsidies is clear. The ability
of black veterans to take advantage of their educational benefits was severely
constrained by racism throughout the country. Blacks were denied access to white
institutions in the North and South and were left with the possibility of attending
299 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
300 Id.
3"' See supra notes 80-110 and accompanying text. These policies are documented in the FHA's
housing manual and its residential grading policies, which awarded high grades only to homogenous
white neighborhoods. See id. Approximately $14.5 billion dollars was spent on the education benefit.
The housing benefit was the "first billion-dollar home credit insurance program," involving billions of
dollars in government guarantees. The massive spending on G.I. Bill programs totaled $95 billion
dollars between 1944 and 1971. See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 37, at 116; FRYDL, supra note 36, at 1,
186; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 116; McKENNA, supra note 44, at 5-7, 43.
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only underfunded historically black colleges.3 2 Because of the Bill, the educational
gap between whites and blacks widened to the detriment of blacks.3°3
Due to the racist administration of the Bill's housing benefit, "it is more
accurate to say that blacks could not use this [benefit].' '3°4 Bankers, following the
FHA guidelines, refused to lend in areas that contained "a large negro population"
and refused to lend to black borrowers. Realtors, following their national code of
ethics, were instructed to preserve the segregation of neighborhoods by avoiding
the introduction of "any race or nationality, or any individual whose presence will
clearly be detrimental to property values." 3 5 In the end, "the vast majority of FHA
and VA mortgages went to white middle-class suburbs. 306
The economic consequences of this government sponsored and subsidized
racism have been devastating for the African-American community. By 1984, only
40 percent of black families owned homes, versus 70 percent of white families, a
statistic that has remained constant as recently as fall 2012.307 Rising house prices
have generated enormous wealth for white families and have left most black
families far behind in net worth. As of 2010, the median net worth of white
households was $110,729, while the median net worth of black households was just
$4,955, only 4.4 percent of the net worth of whites.30 8 The recent financial crisis
has made this gap even worse. 30 9
302 As a result, 95% of black veterans were forced to try to take advantage of their educational benefits
in the more overtly racist, statutorily segregated South. They could only attend the 100 "Colleges for
Negroes," whose facilities were so inadequate that 55% of black veterans seeking higher education there
were turned away because of a lack of capacity.
303 KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 131-33; MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 106-107; Turner & Bound,
supra note 60, at 145, 151; Onkst, supra note 74, at 529-30.
304 FRYDL, supra note 36, at 237-38; KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 139.
305 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 37; MCKENNA, supra note 44, at 50.
306 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85, at 54; McKENNA, supra note 44, at 58; Onkst, supra note
74, at 522.
307 The most recent available data for the 3rd Quarter, 2012, shows that 73.6% of whites owned homes
and just 44.1% of blacks owned homes. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY RACE AND
ETHN1C1TY OF HOUSEHOLDER, TABLE 7 (2012), available at www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/qtr3l2/
q3l2press.pdf. See also KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 164.
308 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN VALUE OF ASSETS FOR HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE OF ASSET OWNED
AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 2010, TABLE 1 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/people/
wealth/data/dtables.html. Accord OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 112, at 2.
3' See Annie Lowry, Recession Worsened Wealth Gap for Races, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29,2013, at Bl.
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Even this brief summary of the race discrimination influencing the enactment
and administration of the Bill shows that this discrimination against blacks was
neither "amorphous" nor "ageless in its reach into the past." The harms caused by
this discrimination reach directly into the present. All of this racial discrimination
against blacks, and the corresponding racial preference extended only to whites, is
provable and well documented both in this Article and in the works of the
historians and sociologists cited herein. If Congress were to conduct hearings and
collect evidence on the question, its conclusions would be the same as the
conclusions others and I have reached.
310
Interestingly, the Court acts inconsistently by allowing remedies for some
past discrimination but then disallowing remedies for the past discrimination the
Court labels "societal." All discrimination addressed in a court is "past
discrimination," i.e., discrimination that occurred in the past. There is not really
that much difference between the past discrimination the Court has found redress-
able and past societal discrimination. As discussed above, the Court has found that
congressional and court remedies for past discrimination can be compelling and has
approved of quotas, affirmative action, and retroactive seniority as remedies for
discrimination.31' The Court has simply narrowed the range of redressable past
discrimination to its narrowest and to the smallest number of cases.
In addition to expressing outright hostility towards the redress of past societal
discrimination as a government interest, the Court has implemented a very
demanding, if not impossible standard for proving such discrimination. Although
the Court has been unclear, Justice O'Connor described the burden of proof as a
"strong basis in evidence for [the] conclusion that remedial action was necessary"
in Croson.312 While these words seem to describe an achievable standard, in its
recent cases the Court has disparaged the possibility of upholding affirmative
action on this basis. Indeed, in Croson the Court rejected the evidentiary value of a
voluminous congressional study documenting nationwide discrimination in the
30 This is not to say that everyone interprets the history of the G.I. Bill uniformly. Some historians write
about it in celebratory terms and emphasize the real gains that African Americans made as a result of the
legislation. See, e.g., SUZANNE METrLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAKING OF
THE GREATEST GENERATION 54-57 (2005) (arguing that the G.I. Bill provided the greatest opportunities
for training and education that African Americans had ever known). The fact remains, however, that
racism affected enormously the opportunities available to African Americans and as a result they never
enjoyed the same quality or quantity of opportunities as their white counterparts.
3 See supra notes 281-91 and accompanying text.
312 Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
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construction industry. If a formal, lengthy congressional study did not constitute a
"strong basis in evidence," it is hard to imagine any evidence that would satisfy the
Court.
The demanding standard of proof that the Court requires to support remedies
for past societal discrimination stands in marked contrast to the harms that the
Court is willing to presume that whites suffer from affirmative action. As discussed
earlier, the Court simply assumes that the white plaintiffs in these cases are
"innocent" and that they have been injured by affirmative action, even if they were
unqualified for admission in the absence of affirmative action.313 The Court credits
the mere assertions, unsupported by any evidence, of injury alleged by relatively
unqualified white plaintiffs then denies the relevance of and evidence of a long
history of racial discrimination.
This double standard shows, rather blatantly, the Court's favoritism towards
whites and the degree to which it molds its doctrines to protect the interests of
whites. The Court's breezy conclusions that evidence of past societal
discrimination is "amorphous" and not compelling are simple value judgments.
One could as easily read the evidence of past racism I have presented and find it
compelling. The Court simply refuses to acknowledge evidence of past and present
racism and its consequences.
One marvels at the breathtaking audacity and dismissiveness of the Court's
rhetoric rejecting past societal discrimination as a compelling government interest.
The redress of past racial discrimination, whether labeled "societal" or otherwise,
should rank as one of the most compelling government purposes under the Equal
Protection Clause.314 In the end, the Court's failure to acknowledge past societal
discrimination as a compelling basis for a remedy is simply a form of white denial
that operates to preserve white interests. This denial, by undermining redress for
discrimination and fairer distribution of desirable social opportunities, reinforces
the already formidable advantages whites hold in education, employment, and
wealth. In effect, the Court's rejection of affirmative action as a small measure of
3,3 See supra notes 213-50 and accompanying text.
4 Girardeau Spann describes the importance of past societal discrimination: "The Supreme Court has
insisted that affirmative action is not available to remedy general 'societal discrimination,' even though
general societal discrimination is precisely the type of diffuse, embedded, and often unconscious
discrimination that continues to perpetuate the attitudes and stereotypes that have been transmitted
during the nation's long history of racial oppression." See Girardeau A. Spann, Whatever, 65 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANc 51 (2012) [hereinafter Spann, Whatever]; see also Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of
Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 249 (2004).
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remedy for past discrimination guarantees that the unjustly gained economic and
educational benefits of federally subsidized racism shall continue to be reserved
exclusively for whites. In addition to protecting the educational and economic
interests of whites, the Court promotes the belief that remedying past
discrimination is unimportant ("not compelling"). As Justice Marshall wrote,
dissenting in the Croson case, a "majority of this Court signals that it regards racial
discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past, and that government bodies
need no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice. 315
2. Diversity Is a Compelling Government Interest
Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that diversity is a compelling
government interest has influenced profoundly the Supreme Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence. For the last thirty-five years, his conception of diversity has
been the principle guiding admissions decisions in colleges and universities across
the country. In Bakke, Justice Powell found that only broad-ranging, and not
racially targeted, diversity constituted a compelling government interest: "the
diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element." '316 He disparaged UC Davis's program because
"petitioner's special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would
hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity." '3 17 In Grutter, Justice
O'Connor embraced Powell's conception of diversity, concluding that "the Law
School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body [and] that a diverse
student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission." '318
Most recently in Fisher, the Court reaffirmed that "obtaining the educational
benefits of 'student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the
use of race in university admissions."' 3
19
3' Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 552-53 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall continued, writing
that "I, however, do not believe this Nation is anywhere close to eradicating racial discrimination or its
vestiges." Id. at 553.
316 Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Powell described his preferred notion
of diversity, which includes "exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership
potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to
communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important." Id. at 317.
3 17 id.
3 18 id.
319 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013).
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Diversity is important, but not principally for the reasons the Court has stated.
Racial diversity matters because we are a racially diverse nation. Educational and
other institutions should be diverse because our country is diverse. Institutions
should be diverse to reflect the distribution of opportunities that would exist in the
absence of racism.3 21 Institutions should also be diverse to remedy the results of
their pervasive denial of educational opportunities to black and other minority
students. Another very important reason for educational institutions to be diverse is
because they are one of the few institutions, in addition to workplaces, where
sustained contact between whites and persons of color can occur under conditions
of relatively equal status. Racial diversity, or integration, under conditions
including equal status, has been shown to reduce racism.3 21 In a racist society like
the United States, 322 the reduction of racism should be a national interest of the
highest importance.
It is striking that none of the rationales I just described play any role in the
Supreme Court's discussions on diversity. The Court's treatment of diversity-
valuable only for its educational benefits-has steered our national conversation
about affirmative action very far away from the most important reason for
affirmative action: to remedy the direct consequences of government-subsidized
racism. Instead of discussing appropriate remedies for this racism, the Court has
steered discussion towards small technical matters such as "critical mass" 323 and
the precise amount of diversity necessary to achieve educational benefits.324
In addition to distracting from the most important reasons for affirmative
action, the Court has found diversity to be compelling only because diversity has
been posited to be in the interest of whites. The importance of diversity as a benefit
320 See FisCus, supra note 217, at 13.
321 Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice: Recent Meta-
Analytic Findings, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 93, 110 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000)
("[M]eta-analytic data support the contention that optimal intergroup contact should be a critical
component of any successful efforts to reduce prejudice.").
322 BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 166, at 208 (noting that the most recent studies of implicit bias
show that fully 75% of whites manifest an automatic preference for whites and a corresponding lack of
preference for blacks).
323 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36; see also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review
in an Age of Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113, 124 (2012) ("The
concept, endorsed in Grutter, is conceptually ambiguous. At present, it is unclear whether critical mass
is a quantitative concept, a qualitative concept, or both.").
324 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419.
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to whites is particularly clear in the Grutter opinion. Justice O'Connor described
the educational benefits of diversity as "substantial": "the Law School's admissions
policy promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races."' 325 Yet it is white students who benefit disproportionately from any such
educational benefits, in part because they are disproportionately over-represented
on most campuses and in part because they are the least likely to have contact with
other racial groups before college: 326 "To the extent that cross-cultural interactions
occur between whites and blacks, Latinos, or Asians, the students of color typically
are the cultural teachers; whites typically are on the receiving end of the exchange,
learning about the culture of color."
3 27
According to Justice O'Connor, diversity helps legitimize majority-white
society and institutions generally. After reciting the importance of diversity to
"major American businesses" and the military's officer corps,32 8 she wrote that "in
order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity." In other words, diversity is necessary to
preserve the legitimacy of American leadership and institutions, which,
notwithstanding our black president, remain overwhelmingly white.
The fact that diversity is posited and defended in the interests of whites is an
apt illustration of Professor Derrick Bell's interest convergence theory. According
to Professor Bell, gains in civil rights, or, in the case of affirmative action, the
preservation of parity, occurs only when it is in the interests of whites: "Once
again, blacks and Hispanics are the fortuitous beneficiaries of a ruling motivated by
other interests that can and likely will change when different priorities assert
themselves."329
The diversity rationale is, then, deeply problematic. It steers us away from the
far more important discussion about how to remedy extensive government-
325 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
326 Brown-Nagin, supra note 323, at 130 ("Whites are the least likely to comfortably interact with those
from different racial backgrounds because they are the least likely of all college matriculates to have
interacted with other racial groups prior to arriving on campus.").
327 Id.
328 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-32.
329 Bell, supra note 235, at 1625.
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subsidized racism in the administration of Bill benefits.33 A focus on diversity as
understood by the Court disparages the significance of race and race discrimination
in our history and contributes to widespread public ignorance about race.331 The
diversity rationale is also quite vulnerable to changes in the perceived value or need
for diversity. As soon as the justices decide that the educational benefits of
diversity are questionable or insufficient, the diversity rationale will be rejected and
affirmative action will be rejected along with it. In contrast, affirmative action as a
remedy for past discrimination rests on evidentiary underpinnings that are less
subject to debate and judicial or public whim.
D. Summarizing and Assessing the Doctrines of Delusion
These, then, are the doctrines of delusion.
1. Assumptions the Court Relies upon About Affirmative
Action Generally
The Court tells us that because affirmative action increases the stigma borne
by students of color it should be curtailed. This translates into the proposition that
increases in white racism in response to the presence of black people and other
minorities are a proper reason to curtail remedies for white racism. This rationale,
stripped of legalese, is as unsavory as it is circular.
The Court tells us that affirmative action constitutes racial preferences for
blacks and "reverse discrimination" against whites. However, remedies for past
discrimination against blacks in education, housing, and employment do not
constitute "preferences" at all, any more than restitution from a thief who steals my
wallet constitutes a "bonus" or a "preference" for me. The true beneficiaries of
racial preferences are the white veterans who received their G.I. Bill benefits
exclusively because of their white race and their heirs who have reaped all the
ensuing educational and economic gains from race discrimination against blacks.
Yet the Court fails entirely to recognize these exclusively white racial preferences.
It is impossible to reconcile the claim that affirmative action constitutes "reverse
discrimination" against whites with a factual record that proves that whites
continue to be the most privileged, overrepresented racial group in higher
education. It is simply false to characterize remedial affirmative action as a "racial
preference" or as "reverse discrimination" against whites.
330 Id.
"' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 ("Petitioner's special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity,
would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.").
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The Court tells us that whites are "innocent victims" of affirmative action
programs. Remarkably, for a court of law, the Court simply assumes both the
innocence and the victimization of the plaintiffs in affirmative action cases without
any basis in evidence. Yet claims of white innocence are weakened seriously by the
unearned advantages that racism produced, and continues to produce, for whites.
Claims of victimization are hard to swallow when the plaintiffs in the education
cases would not have been admitted in the absence of affirmative action. Whites
are clearly not "innocent victims" of affirmative action. Rather, they are
beneficiaries of past discrimination against blacks and of the Court's generous
favoritism in granting all whites the sympathetic status of "innocent victims."
This first set of assumptions about affirmative action-increased stigma,
"racial preferences" for blacks constituting "reverse discrimination" against whites,
whites as "innocent victims"-does not fare well under close analysis. They are
either supportive of white racism, highly misleading, or false.
2. Premises That Support Application of Strict Scrutiny in
Affirmative Action Cases
Justice Powell tells us that whites, like blacks, have been victims of
discrimination and that there is no principled way of distinguishing between the
discrimination experienced by whites and blacks. In his myopic view, whites and
blacks are therefore similarly situated with respect to the Equal Protection Clause.
Yet everyone with any knowledge of history knows that the race discrimination
experienced by blacks in the United States is and has been immeasurably worse
than anything experienced by white ethnicities. The history of the administration of
the G.I. Bill proves the racial preferences granted to whites and the outright race
discrimination experienced by blacks. The voluminous evidence of the unique
severity, ubiquity, and longevity of race discrimination against blacks provides a
strong, principled basis for differentiating between whites and blacks. The Court
tells us "the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to
one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. 332
Despite the superficial appeal of this grand rhetoric, the statement is belied by the
Court's own precedents, showing that it regularly allows the guarantee of equal
protection to mean different things for different people. In particular, the Court has
permitted differential treatment of others by race as a remedy for past
discrimination. The Court's adoption of a principle requiring "sameness" of
treatment negates the United States' long history of race discrimination against
332 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
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blacks and forecloses the possibility of any meaningful remedy for that history. The
Court thus denies equality by insisting on formally equal treatment, despite the fact
that whites and blacks are not similarly situated with respect to the history and
consequences of race discrimination.
These conceptual underpinnings of strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases
are therefore very weak. The assertion equating the discrimination experienced by
white ethnicities and blacks is historically false. Under circumstances of
government-sponsored race discrimination against blacks and racial preferences for
whites, the insistence that equal protection must be formally the same for both
groups promotes continuing inequality by preserving unjustly gained white
advantages in education and wealth and preventing or limiting affirmative action
that would reduce these disparities. The Court denies, rather than promotes, racial
equality.
3. Conclusions About Compelling Government Interests
The Court tells us that past societal discrimination is "amorphous" and
therefore is not a compelling government interest. Yet I have provided much
evidence of past societal discrimination and its serious continuing effects. Like an
ostrich with its head firmly planted in the sand, the Court simply ignores our racial
history. The Court's denial of our history, like its insistence on strict scrutiny for
remedial affirmative action, supports its protection of white educational and
economic interests.
The Court tells us that, unlike remedying past societal discrimination, the
educational benefits of racial diversity constitute a compelling government interest.
Yet these benefits accrue principally to white students, who are least likely to have
contact with other racial groups before college, and to white institutions that gain
legitimacy through the presence of a few persons of color in their midst. It is
noteworthy that the only interest that the Court allows to support affirmative action
is an interest that principally benefits whites.
In concluding that diversity is compelling but remedying past societal
discrimination is not, the Court prefers a weak rationale that benefits whites, over a
strong rationale that would likely be of greater benefit to blacks and other
minorities. Once again, the Court prefers the interests of whites. Once again, the
Court refuses to engage with our long history of white race discrimination against
blacks.
Overall, then, these basic premises do not support the Court's hostility and
skepticism towards affirmative action. Upon critical consideration, the Court's
premises are false, highly misleading, supportive of white racism, and protective of
unjustly gained advantages held by whites in education and economic well-being.
This evaluation of the Court's premises tells us that the Court, ignoring all
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evidence, promulgates false and misleading doctrines, the doctrines of delusion,
that are self-serving for whites by protecting white interests. The next section
explores the degree of public belief in these doctrines.
III. THE COURT AS A MAJORITARIAN INSTITUTION
This Part examines the close correspondence between the Court's premises
and conclusions about affirmative action and the views of a majority of whites on
the same issues. I also consider the implications of this congruence. In the
affirmative action cases, the Court emerges as a majoritarian institution intent on
protecting the educational, economic and status interests of whites.
The subsection below describes the views of a majority of whites on race, in
an order corresponding roughly to the discussion of the Court's premises above.
The views described in this subsection come from public opinion polls and studies
conducted about race relations. The next section explores the Court as a
majoritarian institution, reflecting the values and ideas of a majority of whites.
A. Majoritarian Beliefs About Race
Like the Court, most whites disapprove of giving presumed "preferences to
blacks and other minorities" '333 and many whites believe that affirmative action
constitutes "reverse discrimination" against whites.334 Most whites also believe that
whites are the "innocent victims" of affirmative action.335 According to political
scientist Ron Fiscus, the "[innocent persons argument] is a widely held, racially
polarizing social argument. The near-universal belief in it is without doubt the
single most powerful source of popular resentment of affirmative action." '336 The
Court's easy willingness to assume the validity of white innocence and
victimization without evidence surely fuels this belief. Remarkably, a recent study
found that whites now view themselves as the primary victims of racism.
"I FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 124; see also HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL
ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 182 (1997) [hereinafter SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES] ("Depending on
phrasing, [white support for compensatory preferential treatment for blacks] has ranged from at most a
third of the white public to just a few percentage points, with little evidence of change over time.").
334 Id. at 124, 198-99.
131 See, e.g., MELANIE E.L. BUSH, EVERYDAY FORMS OF WHITENESS 206 (2011) [hereinafter BUSI,
EVERYDAY WHITENESS].
336 Cf FISCUS, supra note 217, at 7 ("It will not be easy to convince working-class whites 'that they
need not pay for the sins of discrimination with jobs they already have, but that they must do so with
jobs or promotions they might otherwise have gotten but for affirmative action."').
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According to this study, "changes in Whites' conceptions of racism are extreme
enough that Whites have now come to view anti-White bias as a bigger societal
problem than anti-Black bias. 3
37
Most whites hold these beliefs despite the fact that they are demonstrably
false. Whites remain the most privileged and overrepresented group in higher
education, belying both the notions of "racial preferences" for blacks and "reverse
discrimination" against whites because of their race in higher education.33 In the
employment context, very few white people ever report being victims of race
discrimination.339 Only four percent of race discrimination claims filed with the
EEOC are filed by whites.34 Blacks and other people of color file ten times as
many discrimination complaints as whites, even though whites constitute a large
majority of the workforce. 34 ' And claims filed by whites are usually less credible
than claims brought by people of color.342 If race discrimination against whites is a
serious problem there should at least be some evidence of it. On the other hand,
evidence shows the continuing prevalence of both overt race discrimination and
more covert or unconscious manipulation of merit standards against blacks in
employment settings.
343
There is also congruence between the Court's discrediting of past societal
discrimination as "not compelling" and widespread public disbelief about the
seriousness and pervasiveness of past and present racism.3" Many white
117 Norton & Sommers, supra note 194, at 215.
... Jordan Weissman, The Best New Argument for Affirmative Action, THE ATLANTIC (July 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/201 3/07/the-best-new-argument-for-affirmative-action/
278241/ ("[W]hite students are now more overrepresented at the most selective U.S. colleges than they
were in 1995.... Our top schools are even whiter, at least compared to the U.S. population as a whole,
than when grunge was still big.").
... WISE, supra note 179, at 35.
340 Id.
341 Id.
32 Id.
" See, e.g., Ryan Light et al., Racial Discrimination, Interpretation and Legitimation at Work,
reprinted in Mathew 0. Hunt & George Wilson, Race, Racial Attitudes and Stratification Beliefs:
Evolving Directions for Research and Policy, 634 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 39, 42-43, 48-
50 (2011) [hereinafter Light et al., Racial Discrimination at Work] ("Qualitative work on black
experiences indicates that discrimination remains a persistent problem.").
34" Id. at 88.
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Americans hold a rosy view of the racist past of the United States and "the extreme
oppressiveness of U.S. slavery is thus not taken seriously." '345 The evidence shows
that most whites have consistently minimized the seriousness of racism as a barrier
to the participation of blacks and other people of color in education and the
economy.3 46 For example, Gallup polls conducted in 1962 and 1963 found that
"between two-thirds and nearly 90 percent of whites said blacks were treated
equally with regard to jobs, schooling and housing opportunities. 3 47 These are
remarkable beliefs, since these polls were taken before enforcement of Brown v.
Board of Education and before enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.348 This
was the time of state-mandated separate and unequal schools and massive Southern
resistance to desegregation. This was the time of unabashed, federally-subsidized
race discrimination in higher education, housing, and lending, and unconstrained,
open race discrimination in employment. In 1959, black men had average weekly
earnings that were approximately 57 percent of the earnings of white men.3 49 It
remains true today that, compared to whites, blacks and Latinos experience much
greater poverty, earn substantially less income, and hold much less wealth.35 ° The
fact that whites could believe and still believe that blacks were treated equally
under factual circumstances demonstrating vast inequality speaks volumes about
the degree of white denial of racial reality.
Although conditions for African-Americans have improved, especially since
World War II, many whites continue to deny the significance of, and even the
existence of, race discrimination against blacks.3"' The majority of whites "do not
14' FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 88; see also SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES,
supra note 333, at 163-66 ("Thus an emphasis on past oppression of blacks as a basic source of racial
inequality has lost support over the past two decades, particularly among more educated white
Americans.").
346 See also Light et al., Racial Discrimination at Work, supra note 343, at 42 ("Whites... often express
support for meritocratic ideals ... yet they remain reticent to acknowledge potential structural and
historical impediments that minority groups face.").
347 TIM J. WISE, COLORBLIND 65, 197 n.42 (2010); WISE, supra note 179, at 39.
348 See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLow HOPE (1993) (demonstrating that Brown made little
difference for 10 years after the decision).
311 See James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black/White Male Earnings and Employment, in THE
DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 233 (F. Thomas Juster ed., 1977) (citing data from the 1960
Census).
350 BUSH, EVERYDAY WHITENESS, supra note 335, at 4, 6.
31' FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 88; SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES, supra note
333, at 171 ("The majority of whites deny the importance of discrimination and place most of the
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believe there is major racial discrimination widespread across this society. 35 2
Contrary to the evidence, "40 to 60 percent of all whites say that the average Black
American fares equally or better in terms of job, incomes, schooling, and health
care than the average white person, despite the reality that Blacks continue to lag
behind significantly in many or most categories." '353 According to a 2009 poll, 76
percent of whites reported that "Blacks have achieved racial equality, or will soon
achieve it." '354 The majority of whites "reconcile the continuing reality of racial
inequality with their beliefs about little discrimination by blaming people of color
for their lack of effort." '355 The belief that race discrimination is inconsequential
stands in marked contrast to the findings of many recent studies of implicit bias,
which find that seventy-five percent of Americans hold implicit preferences for
whites relative to blacks.
356
A final predominant white belief deserves comment. One study showed that
nearly two-thirds of whites "did not think that whites as a group had benefitted
from past and present discrimination against black Americans." '357 Such beliefs are
disproved by the history of the G.I. Bill's federally-subsidized racial preferences
for whites and race discrimination against blacks. The idea that whites have not
benefitted from racism against blacks is simply irreconcilable with the historical
record.
There is, therefore, much congruence between what the Court tells us about
race and affirmative action and what most whites believe. Most whites inhabit a
world filled with racial beliefs that are false, unsupported by evidence and self-
burden for black disadvantage on blacks themselves, putting primary emphasis on inadequate black
motivation.").
352 FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 101; SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES, supra note
333, at 169, 171 ("White respondents have some difficulty when asked to account for black
disadvantage. The type of explanation that has greatest appeal is one that focuses on a lack of motivation
by blacks to improve their own status in America.").
3" BUSH, EVERYDAY WHITENESS, supra note 335, at 4, 168.
3
"Id. at4, 168.
... FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 101; SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES, supra note
333, at 169, 171 ("White respondents have some difficulty when asked to account for black
disadvantage. The type of explanation that has greatest appeal is one that focuses on a lack of motivation
by blacks to improve their own status in America."); BUSH, EVERYDAY WHITENESS, supra note 335, at
169.
356 BANAIi & GREENWALD, supra note 166, at 208.
117 FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 12 (citing BLENDON ET AL., supra note 10, at 66).
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serving. One recent study of white Californians found that their understandings of
racial reality "are not a rational, unbiased reflection of available evidence, but
instead reflect strong motivations to deny the impact of racism." '358 One can
understand why whites would have strong motivations to deny or remain ignorant
of the facts surrounding race and racism. White ignorance and denial support the
presumed entitlement of whites as a group to the unjustly gained economic and
educational advantages of white racism.
For whites as a group, there is no more self-serving and comforting set of
interlocking beliefs than to believe that whites are the innocent victims of
widespread racial preferences and racial discrimination in a world now free of
racism against blacks, a racism that was never serious and that provided no benefit
to whites.
B. The Majoritarian Court
The Supreme Court's affirmative action cases largely implement white biases
and protect white interests. These cases teach us that the Court is a principally
majoritarian institution acting consistent with majoritarian beliefs and values.359 As
stated by Michael Klarman, "the conventional wisdom that the U.S. Supreme Court
heroically defends racial minorities from majoritarian oppression is deeply flawed:
Over the course of American history, the Court, more often than not, has been a
regressive force on racial issues."36 When it comes to protecting minority interests,
"the Court identifies and protects minority rights only when a majority or near
majority of the community has come to deem those rights worthy of protection."361
While it may seem unusual to most lawyers to consider the Court as a
majoritarian institution, political scientists have long understood the Court's
devotion to majoritarian interests. In 1935, Dr. Ralph Bunche described:
358 See FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA, supra note 164, at 88 (citing Glenn Adams et al., The Effect of Self-
Affirmation on Perception of Racism, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 616-26 (2006)).
359 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); GIRARDEAU A. SPANN,
RACE AGAINST THE COURT 3, 19-22 (1993) [hereinafter SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT].
" Michael J. Klarman, Has the Supreme Court Been Mainly a Friend or a Foe to African Americans?,
SCOTUS BLOG (Feb. 1, 2010, 10:26 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/has-the-suprerne-court-
been-mainly-a-friend-or-a-foe-to-african-americans/.
361 Id.; see also SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 359, at 3 ("The Supreme Court is better
understood as serving the veiled majoritarian function of promoting popular preferences at the expense
of minority interests.").
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The failure to appreciate the fact that the instruments of the state are merely the
reflections of the political and economic ideology of the dominant group....
[T]he Constitution is a very flexible instrument ... in the nature of things, it
cannot be anything more than the controlling elements in American society wish
it to be.
362
In the 1960s, political scientist Robert Dahl wrote that "the policy views dominant
on the court are never very long out of line with the policy views among the
lawmaking majorities of the United States.... [T]he Supreme Court is inevitably a
part of the dominant national alliance."3 63 More recently, legal scholar Barry
Friedman has also described the majoritarian nature of the Court.364
Not only is the Court a highly majoritarian institution, but through its
affirmative action decisions the Court has made itself the nation's primary
policymaker on racial issues. This is so because, with the exception of Grutter, the
Court has struck down the decisions of more democratically responsive branches of
federal, state, and local government to voluntarily engage in affirmative action.
3 65
This is a deeply ironic and disturbing result for several reasons. First, it is
Congress, not the Court, which has the explicit constitutional power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 66 It is inappropriate for the Court to use its powers of
judicial review to supersede an explicit constitutional grant of power to Congress.
In addition, the Court has a very poor record historically in respecting or
enforcing the equality of non-whites in the United States. Prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court rendered proslavery decisions supporting a national right to
capture fugitive slaves 367 and disparaging blacks as "so far inferior, that they had
362 Ralph J. Bunche, A Critical Analysis of the Tactics and Strategies of Minority Groups, 4 J. NEGRO
EDUc. (1935), quoted in Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives'Passion for the Unattainable, 94
VA. L. REV. 495 (2007).
363 Linda Greenhouse, Law and Politics, Opinion Pages, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014.
3" See FRIEDMAN, supra note 359, at 369-72.
363 Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995);
see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (disabling
local governments from voluntarily engaging in limited race-conscious efforts to enhance
desegregation).
366 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
361 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
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no rights which the white man was bound to respect. 3 68 The Court also approved
of white dominion and control over the lands, and eventually the fates, of American
Indians.3 69 After enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has: struck
down laws protecting the civil rights of blacks;37 enforced segregation;
371
permitted the racist internment of Japanese-Americans; 372 prevented redress for
structural inequality;3 73 permitted re-segregation of public education; 374 and struck
down protective provisions of the Voting Rights Act.375 While the Warren Court
rendered important decisions enforcing minority rights, most prominently Brown v.
Board of Education3 76 and Loving v. Virginia, that Court is now understood to be
an anomaly.
3 77
The Court's majoritarian orientation and the congruence between the Court's
and the general public's hostility toward affirmative action, virtually guarantee that
the Court will continue limiting affirmative action. Fisher's nod in the direction of
stricter application of strict scrutiny is a small step in this direction.3 78 More
recently, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,379 the Court took a
368 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
369 Johnson v. M'ntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
370 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
" Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
372 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
374 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
171 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
376 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
177 See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial Review and Populism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 313, 353
(2003) ("In many ways, the years from 1936 to 1969 were an anomaly. The Warren Court decisions ...
were different because they extended constitutional protection to blacks, to the poor, to those accused of
crime, and to those purveying sexually-oriented books. And they were different because the Court often
actively promoted democratic decision-making.").
378 133 S. Ct. at 2428-29. One could ask why, if that is the Court's primary goal, did the Court not just
eliminate affirmative action altogether in Fisher? One answer is "that invalidating an affirmative action
plan so closely modeled on the plan upheld in Grutter will make it difficult to view the Court's distaste
for affirmative action as anything other than purely political." Spann, Whatever, supra note 314, at 203.
379 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
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major step towards the abolition of affirmative action by allowing Michigan voters
to adopt a constitutional amendment banning affirmative action.38
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of the G.I. Bill shows racial preferences for whites and overt race
discrimination against blacks by the federal government, educational institutions,
bankers, realtors and local neighborhood homeowners' associations. Due to this
race discrimination, promoted and subsidized by the federal government, black
veterans were denied opportunities for higher education and home ownership. The
economic consequences of this race discrimination have been costly for the
African-American community.
Affirmative action was originally conceived as a remedy for past race
discrimination against blacks and other minorities. Yet instead of upholding the
voluntary efforts of universities, localities and the federal government to provide
some remedy for our history of race discrimination, the Court has, with the
exception of Grutter, uniformly rejected and even disparaged such efforts.
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke relied on numerous false and misleading
premises to justify strict scrutiny review and to reject past societal discrimination as
a compelling government interest. These false, misleading premises are the
"doctrines of delusion." To one degree or another, the Court recites and relies upon
these doctrines of delusion in all its affirmative action cases since Bakke,
culminating in its most recent decisions in Fisher and Schuette. Doctrines of
delusion thus constitute the heart of the Supreme Court's rationales for opposing
remedial affirmative action and allowing only a weaker "diversity" rationale.
The history of race discrimination in the enactment and administration of the
G.I. Bill prove the falsity and misleading nature of the doctrines of delusion. The
Court's rote adoption of these doctrines, notwithstanding contrary evidence and
argument, raises serious questions about the Court's role in our society. The Court
has made itself the nation's primary policymaker on race, despite its dismal
historical record of promoting and permitting injustice and inequality for African
Americans and other minorities. The congruence between the Court's and the
public's views on race and affirmative action show the Court to be a principally
majoritarian institution that protects majoritarian interests. In the context of
380 Id.
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affirmative action, the Court plainly prefers and protects the educational, economic
and status interests of whites.
As stated by one writer, "racism is not merely a simplistic hatred. It is, more
often, broad sympathy toward some and broader skepticism toward others."38' The
Court has shown its broad sympathy toward whites and its broader skepticism
toward blacks and toward attempts to remedy our history of past discrimination
against them. The Court promulgates false doctrines of delusion to justify
doctrinally its preferences for whites and their interests.
This is what the evidence shows. We should trust the evidence, not the
rhetoric. We should see the Court not as a court of justice or equality, but rather as
a primary defender of white privilege and racial inequality.
381 Ta-Nehisi Coates, Fear of a Black President, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2012), available at http://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/09/fear-of-a-black-president/309064/.
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